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The Executive Power of the Commonwealth is shrouded in mystery. Although the 
scope of the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament has been settled for 
some time, the development of the Executive power has not followed suit.  
 
Over the last decade, the High Court has developed jurisprudence on the Executive 
Power – largely invoking more questions than answers – and while not conclusively 
defining it, certainly suggesting that there are limits. This thesis argues that one limit 
is the principle of responsible government.  
 
Responsible government requires that the Executive government be accountable to 
the Parliament. The accountability aspect allows Parliament to scrutinise the conduct 
of the Executive. This is of critical importance because the Executive has its own 
sphere of activity, acting through its non-statutory power, prerogative power and 
nationhood power. When the Executive acts, the activities necessarily require the 
expenditure of money. The money the Executive expends is not its own money, 
rather, it is public money in the Consolidated Revenue Fund.  
 
This thesis examines two key cases of expenditure initiated by the Executive 
government; Pape, and the impugned Tax Bonus Act that provided the fiscal stimulus 
package in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis; and Williams, which was a 
contract between the Commonwealth Government and Scripture Union Queensland 
for funding under the National Schools Chaplaincy Programme.  
 
Overall, this thesis highlights that as responsible government is entrenched in the 
Constitution, and the final say on all expenditure is provided by Parliament as 
representative of the people, the outcomes of the Pape and Williams cases point to 
the High Court limiting the ambit of the Executive Power by reference to the 
principle of responsible government. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis examines the manner in which the Executive Government of the 
Commonwealth functions and participates in the Government of Australia. In 
particular, it will examine the High Court’s treatment of Executive Government 
action. The examination argues that the High Court is informed by the principle of 
responsible government as a method to limit the ambit of the Executive power. In 
particular, it will demonstrate that the High Court has limited the ability of the 
Executive to participate in activities without legislative support because it is against 
the principle of responsible government. 
 
The first two sections of this Chapter introduce the difference between the High 
Court’s treatment of legislative power, on the one hand, and executive power, on the 
other. Broadly, it highlights a marked difference in the High Court’s application of 
reasoning between the two spheres of power; expanding legislative power and 
limiting executive power. 
 
By way of background: at the time of the Great Australasian Convention Debates, 
the Framers of the Constitution regarded legislative and executive power as co-
extensive.1 By co-extensive, this paper adopts the approach of the literature to mean 
that the respective fields of power were conceived to be as powerful as each other. 
Despite this, the High Court saw fit to expand the ambit of legislative power. It did 
so, contrary to its original conception, into fields of activity that the Framers of the 
Constitution never expected.2 An illustration of this is provided in the next section.3 
In contrast, the High Court’s treatment of the executive power differs. Its judicial 
treatment demonstrates a reluctance to define the executive power’s limits – neither 
conclusively expanding or limiting the power – rather, eschewing any attempt at 
doing so and in its place, engaging the power only when absolutely necessary. In this 
author’s view, the Australian conception of the executive power is unique to the 
Commonwealth of Australia4 and is still finding its place within the framework of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Another word that is often used is ‘coterminous’. 
2 The author is not entering the debate on whether or not the High Court should have done so. The 
author merely notes this as fact. 
3 See ‘I A Shift of Legislative Power’. 
4 I will illustrate the difference of the Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia by 
reference to both the Executive Power of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America. 
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the Australian Federation.5 I write the preceding sentence to demonstrate that the 
executive power is in no way as established as the legislative power;6 it is a reference 
point with which to base the ambit of this thesis.  
 
I A SHIFT OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 
 
Responsible government formed a key part in shaping the Commonwealth of 
Australia. It was discussed at length during the Great Australasian Convention 
Debates7 and is entrenched in the structure of the Constitution.8 However, since 
Federation in 1901, we have seen dramatic changes in the manner in which the 
powers that govern the Commonwealth of Australia are exercised due to a change in 
the interpretation of the Constitution. The major change was that in the Engineers 
Case9 in 1920. The preceding 15 years, following the appointment of Higgins and 
Isaacs JJ, saw the High Court of Australia have a marked shift in the approach taken 
to interpreting the Constitution.10  
 
The three founding Justices, Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ, interpreted the 
Constitution utilising the method known as originalism. This approach interpreted 
the Constitution according to its original meaning.11 This interpretation sought to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This thesis will not discuss that particular topic; it is a large and complex issue which requires a 
wider scope than this dissertation allows. Such an analysis is apt for a much larger body of work. 
6 By this I assert that the High Court has very clearly defined the scope of Commonwealth legislative 
power. See: New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 (‘Work Choices’). 
7 See, eg, Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Sydney 2 March to 9 
April, 1891; Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, 22 March to 
5 May, 1897; Official Record of the debates of the Australasian Federal Convention: Second Session, 
Sydney, 2 September to 24 September, 1897; Official Records of the Debates of the Australasian 
Federal Convention: Third Session, Melbourne, 20 January to 17 March, 1898. 
8 See below at Chapter Two: Responsible Government in Australia; Part II Representative 
Government and Part III Responsible Government.  
9 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Pty Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129 
(‘Engineers’). 
10 See, eg, Baxter v Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087; Federated Engine Drivers’ 
and Firemen’s Association of Australia v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1911) 12 CLR 398; 
Attorney-General (Qld) v Attorney-General (Cth) (1915) 20 CLR 148; Federated Municipal and Shire 
Council Employees Union of Australia v The Lord Mayor, Alderman, Councillors and Citizens of 
Melbourne and Others (1918-1919) 25 CLR 508. 
11 D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91 114 (Griffith CJ, Barton and O’Connor JJ); Deakin v Webb 
(1904) 1 CLR 585, 616 (Griffith CJ). See: J D Heydon, ‘Theories of constitutional interpretation: a 
taxonomy’ (2007 Winter) Bar News: Journal of the NSW Bar Association 12. Heydon describes seven 
theories of ‘originalist’ interpretation. They are: the 1900’s meaning: 13-16; connotation and 
denotation: 16; ambulatory words: 16-17; the evolutionary nature of legal expressions: 17; essential 
and non-essential elements of 1900 meaning: 17-18; the centre and the circle; the core and the 
penumbra: 18-19 and the actual intention of the founders: 19. See also, Jennifer Clarke, Patrick 
Keyzer and James Stellios, Hanks Australian Constitutional Law: Materials and Commentary 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2013) 120 [1.8.13]. 
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‘avoid any corresponding reduction in the powers of the States which would be 
inconsistent with the Constitution’s broader federal vision.’12 
 
Following the addition of Higgins and Isaacs JJ to the High Court,13 a split emerged 
when interpreting the Constitution. The split resulted in a shift from unanimous 
decisions to a 3:2 majority. The split arose from a competing interpretive approach, 
literalism, which was consistently utilised by Higgins and Isaacs JJ. A literal 
approach interprets the Constitution in accordance with the plain and ordinary 
natural meaning of the words.14 It, in effect, gives words their widest possible 
meaning. As decided by the Engineers majority15 when expanding the reach of 
Commonwealth legislative power,16 the legislative power is ‘“plenary” and “ample” 
… as the Imperial Parliament in the plenitude of its power possessed and could 
bestow.’17 In an effort to reverse this decision, appeal to the Privy Council was 
attempted. It was, however, refused, ‘virtually without reasons.’18 
 
The effect of the literalist approach has been an expansion of the breadth of activity 
that can be undertaken by engaging the legislative power of the Commonwealth. 
Subsequently, successive cases at which the federal division of legislative power has 
been in dispute have been consistently decided in favour of the Commonwealth.19 
There is no doubt that the apogee of the Engineers decision is that of the New South 
Wales v Commonwealth,20 which I refer to at this point to as a clear example of the 
expansive approach that the High Court has adopted in relation to the legislative 
powers of the Commonwealth. A short description of that litigation is as follows. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Greg Craven, ‘The Crisis of Constitutional Literalism in Australia’ (1992) 30(2) Alberta Law 
Review 492, 496. 
13 By way of amendments made to the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) that increased the number of sitting 
justices from three to five. See: Judiciary Act 1905-1906 (Cth). 
14 For a discussion on literalism, see: Heydon, above n 11, 26. I refer to literalism only to establish the 
concept of interpretation according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its words. 
15 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ).  
16 Through overturning previous precent and rejecting the doctrines of implied intergovernmental 
immunities and state reserved powers. See also D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR 91; Peterswald v 
Bartley (1904) 1 CLR 497; Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Association 
v New South Wales Traffic Employees Association (1906) 4 CLR 488. 
17 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Pty Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 163 
(Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ), citing Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 App Cas 117, 132 (Lord 
Fitzgerald). 
18 Murray Gleeson, ‘The Influence of the Privy Council on Australia’ Anglo-Australian Lawyers 
Society, speech delivered in Sydney on 31 May 2007, 2. 
19 Craven, above n 12, 495; David Hume, Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘Heresy in the High 
Court? Federalism as a constraint on Commonwealth power’ (2013) 41 Federal Law Review 71, 86. 
20 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 (‘Work Choices’). See Hume, Lynch and 
Williams, above n 19, 74. 
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Work Choices was a challenge brought by five States and two trade unions against 
the Commonwealth regarding the constitutional validity of the Work Choices Act.21 
The focus of the litigation was the contention of the plaintiffs that the 
Commonwealth’s corporations power in s 51(xx) of the Constitution did not support 
an entire national industrial relations regime to apply to a majority of employees in 
Australia.22 In a judgment that is recognised as giving the words of s 51(xx) of the 
Constitution their widest possible meaning,23 the High Court held that the 
corporations power extends to any law which alters the rights, powers or duties of a 
constitutional corporation, as well as to laws which have a less direct but nonetheless 
sufficiently substantial connection to constitutional corporations.24 What this shows 
is that the High Court has treated the legislative power, a power routinely exercised 
by the Commonwealth Government, in such a way as to expand its scope to what, 
arguably, is able to encompass nearly any activity the Commonwealth wishes to 
participate in. 
 
II DID THE EXECUTIVE POWER REALLY FOLLOW? 
 
The other power the Commonwealth Government routinely exercises is Executive 
Power. As the following discussion will show, the High Court has treated the 
Executive Power differently to the legislative power of the Commonwealth 
Government. 
 
As I will explain in Chapter Two, members of the Commonwealth Government are 
able to exercise both legislative power and executive power if they are Ministers of 
State because our Constitution provides that Ministers of State must sit in one of the 
Houses of Parliament.25 In short, they are ‘the government of the day.’ Chapter Two 
establishes the system that provides a check on Ministers exercising the Executive 
Power – representative and responsible government – in which Parliament scrutinises 
Executive action. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Work Choices Act 2005 (Cth). 
22 Nicholas Aroney, ‘Constitutional Choices in the Work Choices Case, or What Exactly is Wrong 
with the Reserved Powers Doctrine? (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 1, 7. 
23 Greg Craven, ‘How the High Court Failed Us’, Australian Financial Review (Melbourne) 24 
November 2006, 92, cited in ibid 3.  
24 See eg, New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1, 114-5 [178] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ), adopting Re Pacific Coal Pty Ltd (2000) 203 CLR 346, 375 [83]. 
25 Constitution s 64. 
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As I will discuss in Chapters Three and Four, there has been a struggle documented 
by cases since the mid-1970s where the Executive exercises power which appears to 
be power that either should be, or can only be, exercised by Parliament. That is, the 
Executive Government of the Commonwealth exercises power that is thought to be 
power held by the Parliament. On its face, such an exercise of power would breach a 
fundamental doctrine entrenched in our Constitution: the separation of powers 
doctrine. It provides that each arm of government conducts its activities separately 
and does not act outside its own sphere.26 For the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
Parliament legislates, the Executive administers and the Judiciary adjudicates. Prima 
facie, the three arms of government hold separately distributed powers that, when 
taken together, govern Australia. They are kept separate because power corrupts, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely. Famously written by Montesquieu in De l’esprit 
de lois in 1748,27  this is necessary to avoid tyranny.28 Despite the prima facie 
separation, the powers run deeper. For example, interpretation of Ch II of the 
Constitution provides added layers to the Executive Power: the Executive’s non-
statutory power, prerogative power and the concept of ‘Nationhood’.29 These layers, 
constitutionally embedded in s 61, provide the Executive Government of the 
Commonwealth with a type of lawmaking power.  
 
Section 61 of the Constitution was heavily debated during the Great Australasian 
Convention Debates. An early version of the now s 6130 read: 
 
The executive power and authority of the commonwealth shall extend to all matters 
with respect to which the legislative powers of the parliament may be exercised, 
excepting only matters, being within the legislative powers of a state, with respect to 
which the parliament of that state for the time being exercises such powers.31 
 
Sir Samuel Griffith introduced a motion to amend this version; to omit all of the 
words after ‘extend to’ and insert ‘the execution of the provisions of this constitution, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 105 [1.7.1], [1.7.2]. 
27 ‘The Spirit of Laws.’ 
28 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 105 [1.7.1], [1.7.2].  
29 I will discuss this in detail in Chapter Three: III The Bases of Executive Power. 
30 The then clause 8 of Ch II. As at 6 April 1891. 
31 See Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 297 [347] (Heydon J) – emphasis in the 
original (‘Williams’).  
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and the laws of the commonwealth.’32 Sir Samuel reasoned that the ‘amendment 
covers all that is meant by the clause, and is quite free from ambiguity.’33 This, as 
Heydon J opines in Williams, suggests amplitude in the powers conferred by s 61.34 
  
Opinions of Commonwealth Attorneys-General, notably Alfred Deakin and Sir 
Littleton Groom, advocate for a ‘coextensive’ executive power. The second opinion 
ever given by a Commonwealth Attorney-General, on 28 May 1901, provides that 
although the executive power derives from ‘its fountain head – the Crown […] [i]ts 
powers are at least coextensive with its legislative charter.’35 That Attorney-General, 
Deakin, further provided in the Vondel Opinion that he ‘wholly disagreed’ with the 
opinion of the Attorney-General for South Australia, Sir John Gordon, that in matters 
affecting external affairs ‘no power exists in the Commonwealth Government 
regarding either external affairs or the proposition of consuls’, because ‘the 
Commonwealth has no executive power apart from Commonwealth legislation’.36 
Further, Deakin’s opinion was that no attempt to define the Executive Power was 
made because it might involve ‘limitation of the executive power’37 and: 
 
[h]ad it been intended to limit the scope of the executive power to matters on which 
the Commonwealth Parliament had legislated, nothing would have been easier to say 
so. ... The framers of that clause evidently contemplated the existence of a wide 
sphere of Commonwealth executive power, which it would be dangerous, if not 
impossible, to define, flowing naturally and directly from the nature of the Federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See: Anne Twomey, ‘Pushing the Boundaries of Executive Power - Pape, the Prerogative and 
Nationhood Powers’ (2010) 34(1) Melbourne University Law Review 313, 315-16. 
33 Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates (Sydney), 6 April 1891, 777-8 (Sir 
Samuel Griffith). 
34 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 299 [351] (Heydon J). 
35 Alfred Deakin, ‘Position of Commonwealth and States in Relation to Treaties: Source and Extent of 
Commonwealth Executive Power and External Affairs Power: Nature of Adherence to Treaties: 
Channel of Communication Between States and Empire or Foreign Powers’ in Patrick Brazil and 
Bevan Mitchell (eds), Opinions of Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, Volume 1: 
1901-14 (Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981) 3. Note that this comment was not 
directly applicable to this Opinion, rather, it was more of a passing comment. Deakin elaborated on 
this concept in the Vondel Opinion and further provided ‘Executive power exists antecedently to, and 
independently of, legislation; and its scope must be at least equal to that of the legislative power – 
exercised or unexercised: see Alfred Deakin, ‘Channel of Communication with Imperial Government: 
Position of Consuls: Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ in Patrick Brazil and Bevan Mitchell 
(eds), Opinions of Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth of Australia, Volume 1: 1901-14 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981) 131. 
36 Ibid 129-30. 
37 Ibid 130. 
	  
	   7	  
Government itself, and from the powers, exercisable at will, with which the Federal 
Parliament was to be entrusted.38 
 
Deakin concluded that ‘[i]t is impossible to resist the conclusion that the 
Commonwealth has executive power, independently of Commonwealth legislation, 
with respect to every matter to which its legislative power extends.’39 Sir Littleton 
Groom, Commonwealth Attorney-General in 1907, stated that ‘it must be taken to be 
settled law that the executive power of the Commonwealth is coextensive with the 
range of its legislative powers’.40 Finally, as Heydon J noted in Williams, the 
executive power was exclusively used by the Commonwealth for the first six months 
of federation – the first Commonwealth statute receiving royal assent on 25 June 
1901.41 
 
This suggests that executive power being equal to – or as broad as – the legislative 
power of the Commonwealth was intended by the framers of the Constitution. This, 
however, was exclusively debated in the pre-Engineers conception of 
Commonwealth legislative power; that it would be interpreted narrowly. If the 
Opinions above are correct in that the executive power is coextensive with legislative 
power, the result necessarily is that pre-Engineers, the executive power was also 
limited as against the plenary power of the States. The corollary is that post-
Engineers, the executive power would be as powerful and can be engaged in the 
same way. Therefore, by analogy to the above example of Work Choices, if the 
corporations power in s 51(xx) ably provided the subject matter power to enact 
legislation to support the regime, the executive power could also provide the subject 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid 131. 
40 Sir Littleton Groom ‘Whether Coextensive with Legislative Power: When is State Executive Power 
Displaced: Whether Commonwealth has Power By Executive Act to Permit Landing of Foreign 
Troops or Crews’ in ibid 360. As the Opinions’ of Alfred Deakin, this Opinion also concerned the 
power to pass laws with respect to external affairs. 
41 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 313 [386] (Heydon J) – see his Honour’s footnote 
[fn 581]. 
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III SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
 
The High Court, unwavering of the Engineers view with respect to Commonwealth 
legislative power,42 has not applied the same reasoning to the Executive Power.43 
This thesis will argue that the High Court has treated the Executive Power 
differently, in a limited sense, because to do otherwise is against the principle of 
responsible government. This is because responsible government provides for 
accountability of the Executive to Parliament. The importance of this is broadly 
summarised as follows: the executive is accountable to the legislature. The 
legislature, as a body, is accountable to the people through the Members of 
Parliament representing their electorates. The legislature has the exclusive power to 
raise money; therefore, the legislature has the exclusive power to authorise 
expenditure.44 This is because the money raised and expended is not the 
Commonwealth Government’s own money. It is public money. Parliamentarians act 
as representatives of those whom the money is raised from and so there is an 
accountability check directly linked to the citizenry. When the Executive 
Government acts, whether contracting or through legislation, money is required to 
execute those actions. The Executive Government cannot spend that money without 
the approval of Parliament. The approval of expenditure comes in the form of an 
Appropriation Act. 45 
 
My thesis is divided into the following chapters. Chapter Two introduces the concept 
of responsible government. Chapter Three provides an outline of the Executive 
Power. Chapter Four analyses two key cases, Pape46 and Williams47 with the 
principles identified in Chapters Two and Three. I argue that the result of those two 
cases altered existing ideas about a wide and non-justiciable executive power to one 
that is now more closely checked by Parliament through the principle of responsible 
government. Chapter Five, in conclusion, finds that while Executive Power is still 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 As it is seen in the lead up of cases to, and including, New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 
229 CLR 1. 
43 See Shipra Chordia, Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘Williams v Commonwealth – 
Commonwealth Executive Power and Australian Federalism’ (2013) 37(1) Melbourne University Law 
Review 189, 215-16.	  
44 The importance of money in this context is that for the government to undertake activities or enter 
into contracts, it inevitably requires expenditure. 
45 I will describe this process in detail in: ‘Chapter Four: II Pape: B Sections 81, 83 and Parliamentary 
Accountability’. 
46 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 (‘Pape’). 
47 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156. 
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largely undefined and will likely take decades of jurisprudence to conclusively 
identify, it is one that is limited by responsible government.  
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CHAPTER TWO: RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
This Chapter introduces the concept of responsible government and its function in 
Australia’s system of government. The principle of responsible government is one of 
accountability; where the government of the day, the Executive, is held accountable 
for its actions to the Parliament.	  48 The importance of accountability to Parliament is 
paramount because it is Parliament who represents the citizenry.49 Therefore, one 
cannot have responsible government without representative government.50 
 
This Chapter explains responsible government in the following way. Part I 
introduces Australia’s system of government.51 Part II will identify the representative 
aspect of the government, with Part III providing an outline of responsible 
government. Part IV will identify the key features of responsible government in 
Australia as identified in the Williams case, in order to assist the subsequent 
argument in Chapter Four. 
 
I AUSTRALIA’S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 
 
Australia’s system of government is divided into three parts.52 These parts are known 
as the ‘arms’ of government. They are recognised in the Constitution by separating 
the functions and powers of each arm into a separate Chapter.53 Relevantly, Chapter I 
provides for the Legislature, Chapter II provides for the Executive and Chapter III 
provides for the Judicature.54  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 James Stellios, Zines’s The High Court and the Constitution (The Federation Press, 6th ed, 2015) 
548. 
49 Ibid 549.  
50 The concept is partly unique to Australia’s hybrid parliamentary system; it derives from the British 
Westminster system and, as will be explained, adapted to Australia’s system of government. 
51 I will not be defining the State governments and their role in Australia. I am only discussing the 
Commonwealth Government. 
52 The federal system of government is divided into six parts in the Australian Constitution. Along 
with the three ‘Commonwealth’ parts (as written), there is also Ch IV ‘Finance and Trade’, Ch V ‘The 
States’ and Ch VI ‘New States’ (of which s 122 – the territories power – resides). The importance of 
Ch IV ‘Finance and Trade’ in to the distribution of federal power will be expanded on in Chapter Four 
insofar as it relates to limiting executive power. 
53 There are eight chapters in the Constitution. 
54 I observe that the conceptual basis of the Constitution is the ‘free agreement of the people – all of 
the people – of the federating Colonies to unite in the Commonwealth under the Constitution: Leeth v 
Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 486 (Deane and Toohey JJ). I draw importance from this 
observation in the idea that it is still the people that give power to the Constitution by electing 
representatives to Parliament to exercise the powers and functions of the government as provided. The 
significance is that the power exercised must be checked by those who represent the people. 
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A The Parliament 
 
The Parliament is the legislative body of the Commonwealth of Australia. It is 
established in accordance with Chapter I of the Constitution, and consists of the 
Queen and two legislative chambers.55 The chambers are the House of 
Representatives, commonly known as the ‘lower house’, and the Senate, the ‘upper 
house’. It is the Parliament, along with the Governor-General acting as the Queen’s 
representative in Australia, that enables the Australian government to pass legislation 
for and provide governance of, the Commonwealth of Australia. In the Australian 
political system, after an election, the political party with a majority of seats56 in the 
House of Representatives has the ability to form government. This is because it is the 
majority party who is able to pass legislation freely, at least in theory, through the 
House of Representatives.57  
 
B The Executive Government 
 
The Executive Government of the Commonwealth is ‘vested in the Queen and is 
exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative’.58 To assist the 
Governor-General in the exercise of the Executive Government, the Governor-
General is advised by a body known as the Federal Executive Council.59 The Council 
consists of all of the Ministers and Assistant-Ministers of the Commonwealth.60 
These Ministers are the Ministers of State, otherwise known as the Cabinet, and are 
charged to ‘administer … departments of State of the Commonwealth’.61 An 
interesting dichotomy is embedded within s 64 of the Constitution, where it reads: 
 
After the first general election no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer 
period than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the 
House of Representatives. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Constitution s 1. 
56 Presently, the House of Representatives has 150 seats. Therefore, in order to obtain majority, a 
political party must win 76 seats to form government. 
57 By convention, the leader of the party with a majority of seats in the House of Representatives is 
appointed the Prime Minister of Australia. 
58 Constitution s 61. 
59 Constitution s 62. 
60 David Clark, Principles of Australian Public Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3rd ed, 2010) 4 [1.6]. 
61 Constitution s 64. 
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This requires that the Ministers of State, who, in theory, are to give independent 
advice to the Governor-General in the Government of the Commonwealth, to also be 
members of Parliament. Therefore, although ‘[c]abinet and party may not be 
recognised in the Constitution…they are the keys to the exercise of power.’62 
 
At the time of Federation, the forefathers of our Constitution, known as the Framers, 
effectively created a unique,63 hybrid system,64 that was a mix between the 
Westminster Parliamentary system of the United Kingdom65 and the federal political 
of the United States of America. The Framers adopted elements of each.66 For 
example, Westminster comprises the House of Commons, similar to the Australian 
House of Representatives, and the House of Lords, equivalent to the Australian 
Senate,67 and the Queen. Further, like Australia’s political system, and largely from 
where Australia adopted the practice, the political party with the most seats in the 
House of Commons forms the government of the day. The Queen appoints the Prime 
Minister on recommendation and further appoints the Ministers of State on 
recommendation.  
 
The Framers of the Australian Constitution also borrowed heavily from the United 
States Constitution. The United States of America have Articles I, II and III,68 which 
Australia mirrored as Chapters I, II and III.69  In the United States of America, their 
legislature, known as Congress, also comprises two chambers known as the House of 
Representatives and the Senate. The Executive Government of the United States of 
America, however, are completely separate from Congress. Executive appointees are 
selected by the President him or herself. Further, the President does not sit in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Patrick Weller, ‘Parliamentary accountability for non-statutory executive power: Impossible dream 
or realistic aspiration? ‘(2005) 16 Public Law Review 314, 314. 
63 Gabrielle Appleby and Adam Webster, ‘Executive Power under the Constitution: A Presidential and 
Parliamentary System Compared’ (2016) 87 University of Colorado Law Review 1129, 1140. 
64 See generally: R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254. 
65 Geoffrey Lindell, ‘Responsible Government’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government: 
Volume 1 Principles and Values (The Law Book Company Limited, 1995) 76. 
66 See Elaine Thompson, ‘The Constitution and the Australian System of Limited Government, 
Responsible Government and Representative Democracy: Revisiting the Washminster Mutation’ 
(2001) 24(3) University of New South Wales Law Journal 657, 663. 
67 The House Commons in the United Kingdom and the House of Representatives share the same 
colour, as do the House of Lords and the Senate. They are, respectively, coloured green and red. 
68 The American term ‘Article’ is analogous to the Australian ‘Chapter’. 
69 They are analogously entitled: Article I – Legislative, Chapter I – The Parliament; Article 2 – 
Executive, Chapter II – The Executive Government; Article III – Judicial; Chapter III – The 
Judicature. 
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United States Congress, rather, the President occupies a position occupied similar to 
our Monarch.  
 
C The Judicature 
 
The Judicature is the adjudicative arm of our federal government. It derives power 
from Chapter III of the Constitution, namely, through s 71, which provides that: 
 
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme 
Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as 
the Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction. 
The High Court shall consist of a Chief Justice, and so many other Justices, not less 
than two, as the Parliament prescribes. 
 
The Judicature is where we turn to resolve disputes between citizens and citizens; 
citizens and the States; citizens and the Commonwealth; States and the States and the 
Commonwealth and the States.70 It is vested with both original71 and appellate72 
jurisdiction. Original jurisdiction, however, is not to be confused with the inherent 
jurisdiction possessed by the State Supreme Courts.73 
 
Consistent with s 71 of the Constitution, Parliament has created other courts invested 
with federal jurisdiction. These courts are the Family Court of Australia,74 the 
Federal Court of Australia,75 and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.76 
 
These Courts, known as ‘Chapter III Courts’, are identifiable through unique 
features.77 First is security of tenure. Section 72 of the Constitution now provides 
that the ‘appointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 See Huddart, Parker & Co Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 353, 357 (Griffiths CJ). 
71 Constitution s 75. See also the additional original jurisdiction of the High Court in s 76; Judiciary 
Act 1903 (Cth) ss 30(a), 38, 39B and 44. 
72 Constitution s 73. 
73 See eg, Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 16. 
74 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 21(1).  
75 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5. 
76 Federal Circuit Court of Australia Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) s 2. The Federal Circuit 
Court of Australia was formerly the Federal Magistrates Court, which operated from 1999-2013. See 
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth). 
77 Unique in contrast to that of the State Supreme Courts. 
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his attaining the age of seventy years.’78 Early iterations of tribunals purporting to 
exercise federal judicial power were held invalid by the High Court due to a lack of 
tenure.79 
 
Secondly, federal judicial power must be engaged to decide controversies; not to 
provide opinions. As held by the Court in Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, the 
Court must ‘not merely provide an opinion but an authoritative declaration of the 
law.’80 Judicial power itself has been difficult to define over the years and has been 
the subject of much judicial opinion.81 Much concerns the separation of powers 
doctrine, particularly between the executive and judicial branches.82 
 
Thirdly, linked with the concept of a Chapter III Court possessing original, rather 
than inherent, jurisdiction is that federal judicial power can be utilised by State 
Supreme Courts; however, Chapter III Courts cannot exercise State judicial power. 
The leading illustration of this is the cross-vesting of jurisdiction between the courts 
of Australia, which allow certain courts to hear particular matters that were originally 
jurisdictionally locked. In 1987, the Commonwealth and the States assented to a 
scheme known as the Cross Vesting Scheme. It was facilitated by the Parliament and 
each State legislature passing a near identical act, entitled the Jurisdiction of Courts 
(Cross-vesting) Act 1987.83  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 The amendment occurred in 1977. See Constitution Alteration (Retirement of Judges) Act 1977 
(Cth). Note that although prior to this limitation, Chapter III judges were appointed for life, life tenure 
was not explicit in the Constitution. All that was proved by way of removal was by the Governor-
General in Council on an address from both Houses of the Parliament in the same session, praying for 
such removal on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity.  It did so by adding the words ‘The 
appointment of a Justice of the High Court shall be for a term expiring upon his attaining the age of 
seventy years, and that a person shall not be appointed as a Justice of the High Court if he has attained 
that age. 
79 Cf New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54 (‘The Wheat Case’); Waterside Workers’ 
Federation of Australia v JW Alexander Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 424 (‘Alexander’s Case’). 
80 Re Navigation and Judiciary Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257, 264 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich 
and Starke JJ). 
81 See eg, Huddart, Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330; R v Davison (1954) 90 
CLR 353; Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167; Brandy v Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 245; Lutton v Lessels (2002) 210 CLR 333. 
82 See eg, R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builders’ Labourers Federation (1957) 100 CLR 277; 
Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307; State of South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1.  
83 See: Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Cth); Jurisdiction of Courts (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) Act 1987 (Cth); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (NSW); Jurisdiction of 
Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (NT); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Q); 
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (SA); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 
(Tas); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 (Vic); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) 
Act 1987 (WA); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-vesting) Act 1993 (ACT).  
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There are two components to the Scheme. First, the Scheme grants original and 
appellate jurisdiction by and upon each of the participating courts. The participating 
courts are the State Supreme Courts, the Federal Court and the Family Courts.84 The 
High Court, District Courts85 and the various Magistrates Courts (or other courts of 
summary jurisdiction) are excluded. Secondly, the Scheme provides the ability to 
transfer proceedings to the ‘more appropriate’, or best suited court.86 As the scheme 
stood in 1987, it allowed a transfer of judicial power from a State or Territory Court 
to each other State or Territory Court, from the Federal Courts87 to each State and 
Territory Court and from each State and Territory Court to the Federal Courts.88  
 
A change occurred in 1999. A challenge to the cross-vesting scheme was brought in 
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally,89 a matter in which, on the jurisdictional point, it was 
argued that the Federal Court could not be conferred with the power to hear a 
negligence claim through its accrued jurisdiction in consequence of it hearing a 
bankruptcy claim. The High Court held that while the Cross Vesting Scheme can 
grant federal judicial power onto State Courts, and State judicial power onto other 
State courts, the power cannot flow from State Supreme Courts to Federal Courts. 
This is because the jurisdiction of the High Court in Ch III of the Constitution, and, 
therefore, Federal Courts, are created from, and are therefore limited by, the 
Constitution, whereas State Supreme Courts are conferred with inherent jurisdiction 
derived from the Courts of England.90 The Constitution’s reference to State Supreme 
Courts necessitates that those Courts are taken as they are found and in order to 
facilitate the formation of the Commonwealth, relinquished some of their power.91 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Including the Family Court of Western Australia. 
85 Known in Victoria as the County Court. 
86 See: BHP Billiton Limited v Schulz (2004) 211 ALR 523. See also Oceanic Sun Line Special 
Shipping Co Ltd v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197; Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 
538. Cf Spiliada Maritime Corp v Consulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460. 
87 I include the Family Court here as it is a ‘federal’ court – or a Chapter III Court caught by the 
scheme. 
88 The Federal Court of Australia and the Family Courts. 
89 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. 
90 See, eg, Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 16(1) Subject as otherwise provided in this Act, and to 
any other enactment in force in this State, the Supreme Court (a) is vested with and shall exercise such 
and the like jurisdiction, powers, and authority within Western Australia and its dependencies as the 
Courts of Queen’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, or either of them, and the judges thereof, 
had and exercised in England at the commencement of the Supreme Court Ordinance 1861’. 
91 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511; R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535. 
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II REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
The first colonial government was that of the New South Wales colony, created in 
1823 by an Act of the Imperial Parliament.92 It created the New South Wales 
Supreme Court and a Legislative Council, by which laws could be passed ‘for the 
peace, order and good government of New South Wales.’93 At this time, the law 
considered by the Legislative Council could only be brought for consideration by the 
Governor of the colony. In 1842, ‘provision was made for representative 
government. The Imperial Parliament established a Legislative Council with two-
thirds of its members to be elected on a restricted, property-based franchise.’94 Then, 
in 1850, provision was made95 enabling New South Wales to amend its Constitution.  
The Constitution, as amended, created ‘a bicameral legislature with a Legislative 
Assembly elected on the basis of a property and income-based franchise and a 
Legislative Council with members nominated by the Governor on the advice of an 
Executive Council with ministers drawn predominately from the assembly.’96 This 
encouraged the colonies of Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania to enact their 
own Constitutions in 1855-6;97 Queensland followed suit in 186798 and Western 
Australia in 1890.99   This provided ‘great stability in both the structure of the 
Australian parliaments and their electoral processes’100 and ‘autonomy and freedom’ 
to the colonies.101 
 
Such a system made its way into the federal Constitution. Strictly with the people in 
mind, at the federal level, a representative government (or representative 
democracy)102 is ‘understood to mean a system of government where the people in 
free elections [elect] their representatives to the legislative chamber which occupies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 4 Geo IV c 96. 
93 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 94 [1.6.1]. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Australian Constitutions Act (No 2) 1850 (UK) 13 & 14 Vict c 59.  
96 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 94 [1.6.1]. 
97 Victoria Constitution Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict c 55; Constitution Act 1855 (Tas); Constitution Act 
1856 (SA). See: Appleby and Webster, above n 63, 1137-8. 
98 The State of Queensland was founded in 1859. 
99 Clark, above n 60, 176 [7.5]. 
100 Ibid [7.2]. 
101 Appleby and Webster, above n 63, 1137-8. 
102 See: Thompson, above n 66. 
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the most powerful position in the political system.’103 It is provided for in the 
Australian bicameral system in the case of Senators, by being chosen for each State, 
by the people of that State, as one electorate.104 In the case of the House of 
Representatives, they are directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth.105  
 
The  High Court in Lange noted that sections of the Constitution, namely ss 1, 7, 8, 
13, 24, 25, 28, 30 and 128, provide a basis for representative government.106 It is, 
however, subject to ss 7, 10, 22, 24, 30, 31, 34, 39, 46-48 and 51(xxxvi) of the 
Constitution, which gives ‘the Parliament considerable discretion to alter the form of 
electoral laws, and consequently the type of “representative government” that might 
exist.’107 
 
Finally, representative government has received judicial comment. Mason CJ in 
Australian Capital Television provided that: 
 
[t]he very concept of representative government and representative democracy 
signifies government by the people through their representatives. Translated into 
constitutional terms, it denotes that the sovereign power which resides in the people 
is exercised on their behalf by their representatives. … [T]he representatives who are 
Members of Parliament and Ministers of State are not only chosen by the people but 
exercise their legislative and executive powers as representatives of the people. And 
in the exercise of those powers the representatives of necessity are accountable to 
the people for what they do and have a responsibility to take account of the views of 
the people on whose behalf they act.108 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 200 (McHugh J). See also 
Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 56 (Stephen J). 
104 Constitution s 7. 
105 Constitution s 24. 
106 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 558 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
107 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 97 [1.6.8]. See McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 
CLR 140; Langer v Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302. The electoral voting system was challenged 
twice in 2016; unsuccessfully in Day v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of South Australia; 
Madden v Australian Electoral Officer for the State of Tasmania [2016] HCA 20 and Murphy v 
Australian Electoral Commissioner [2016] HCA 36. 
108 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137, 138 (Mason 
CJ). 
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In summary, the essence of representative government is that the ultimate source of 
control of governmental power in Australia is the Australian people.109 
 
 
III RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 
 
Responsible government ‘traditionally has been considered to encompass “the means 
by which Parliament brings the Executive to account” so that “the Executive’s 
primary responsibility in its prosecution of government is owed to Parliament.”’110 It 
is considered a ‘foundation stone of the Australian constitutional edifice [and] 
requires that a government obtain and maintain the confidence of the House of 
Representatives.’111 
 
There are principles by which responsible government operates. Those principles are 
largely not provided by formal written rules, rather, by convention for their 
legitimacy and authority.112 It will be seen that some are constitutionally entrenched. 
These conventions include the following. First, the Governor-General must choose 
Ministers who enjoy confidence of the House of Representatives; though, in exercise 
of this power, responsible government requires the Governor-General to take 
‘account of the functional necessity that the government obtain and maintain the 
support of the House of Representatives.’113 Additionally, the leader of the political 
party with a majority of seats the House of Representatives is the leader of the 
government114, known as the Prime Minister. In practice, the representatives 
appointed as Ministers come from that political party or coalition of parties.115   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 See: McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 273 (Gummow J), citing John Stuart Mill 
in his 1861 publication ‘Considerations on Representative Government’. 
110 Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, 451 [42] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) - footnote 
omitted. 
111 Michael Crommelin AO, ‘Governor-General and the Republic: Powers of the Head of State’ 
(2015) 38 Melbourne University Law Review 1118, 1127, referring to Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 
424, 448-53 [35]-[45] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 472-5 [94]-[99] (McHugh J), 496 [140], 
501-3 [152]-[155] (Kirby J). 
112 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 96 [1.6.4]. Though one reference to ‘responsible 
government’ is made in the Crown Suits Act 1947 (WA) s 8(4). Note, though, that there is indirect 
reference relating to responsible government in the Victorian Constitution. See: Clark, above n 60, 19 
[1.32]. Clark provides at that pinpoint that the ‘Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) refers to the Constitution 
Act 1855 (Vic) in which the term appears’. 
113 Crommelin AO, above n 111, 1129 – emphasis added. 
114 See above, ‘Chapter Two: I Australia’s System of Government A The Parliament’. 
115 Clark, above n 60, 20 [1.32]; Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 96 [1.6.5]. The authors also 
note that this convention applies to State Governors and are conscious that in Queensland, there is 
only one legislative chamber. 
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Second, Ministers must be members of either the House of Representatives or the 
Senate.116  Justice Gummow discusses this aspect in detail in McGinty v Western 
Australia to provide that there is a link between the ‘representative’ and ‘responsible’ 
aspects of our system of government ‘not from express terms so much as from the 
requirement in the last paragraph of s 64 that a Minister be a member of the Senate 
or the House of Representatives.’117  
 
Third, the Governor-General acts on advice of the Ministers.118 However, as 
Appleby and Webster provide, ‘[t]he exercise of executive power in Australia must 
not only be understood by reference to the conventions, but also to the modern 
practice of responsible government.’119 This ‘modern practice’ is aptly articulated in 
Egan v Willis: to ‘question and criticise the government on behalf of the people’.120 
This is conducted through ‘the established mechanisms of parliamentary debate and 
question time, and the requirement that members of the Executive provide 
information to Select Committees of both Houses of Parliament.’121  
 
Finally, ‘the conduct of the executive branch is not confined to Ministers and the 
public service. It includes the affairs of statutory authorities and public utilities 
which are obliged to report to the legislature or to a Minister who is responsible to 
the legislature.’122  
 
Of particular importance when holding Ministers to account comes the role of the 
Senate, who, ‘through the use of its power of censure, has developed an important 
role in holding ministers answerable.’123 While the power of censure is not under 
examination in this thesis, this illustrates how the Executive, through an individual 
Minister, is accountable to Parliament and the repercussions that censure can have on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 See Constitution s 64. 
117 McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 296 (Gummow J) – emphasis added. 
118 See Constitution s 62. 
119 Appleby and Webster, above n 63, 1143. 
120 Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, 451 [42] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
121 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 361 [515] (Crennan J). See: Weller, above n 62, 
316-17. 
122 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
123 Thompson, above n 66, 664. 
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government.124 In practice, however, strict responsibility is changing due to a 
‘reduced political expectation that Ministers will be responsible to Parliament for the 
actions of their department.’125 This is because, first, the sizes of departments are 
increasing; and secondly, the centralisation of decision making power vests in the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. Therefore, individually, Ministers may increasingly 
have little autonomy over their own departments.126 Therefore, securing 
accountability of all government activity is the very essence of responsible 
government.127 
 
The great significance of these conventions to the Australian system of government 
is illustrated, as the Court in Lange observed, by their embedding in ss 6, 49, 61, 62, 
64, 83 and 128 of the Constitution.128 This was analysed by the Court in Egan v 
Willis, critically, that:  
 
those provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution which prescribe the system of 
responsible government [necessarily imply] ‘a limitation on legislative and 
executive power to deny the electors and their representatives information 
concerning the conduct of the executive branch of government…’129  
 
To broadly summarise, responsible government, then, is ‘that form of government in 
which the executive is drawn from the legislature and is constitutionally responsible 
to it.’130 That function of the legislature, in this context, is to scrutinise Executive 
conduct.131 It holds the Executive to account, thus giving rise to the idea of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Ibid 665. Censure is a formal expression of disapproval.  
125 Appleby and Webster, above n 63, 1149. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, 451 [42] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) – footnote 
omitted. 
128 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 558-9 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
129 Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, 451-2 [42] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See Lange v 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 561 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
130 Malcolm Aldons, ‘Responsible, Representative and Accountable Government’ (2001) 60(1) 
Australian Journal of Public Administration 34, 35. See also the comment of Barwick CJ: ‘the 
Australian Constitution is built upon confidence in a system of parliamentary responsibility’: 
Attorney-General (Cth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 24. 
131 Christos Mantziaris, ‘Egan v Willis and Egan v Chadwick: Responsible Government and 
Parliamentary Privilege’ (Research Paper No 12, Laws and Bills Digest Group, Parliament of 
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‘accountable government.’132 Its effect is that ‘the actual government of the State is 
conducted by officers who enjoy the confidence of the people.’133 This is the link134 
between ‘representative’ and ‘responsible’ government, by which the Executive is 
ultimately held to account by the people through their elected representatives. The 
‘people’ are the ‘national group, the people of the Commonwealth’.135 This is 
particularly necessary because although‘[c]abinet and party are not recognised in the 
Constitution[,] they are the keys to the exercise of power.’136 
 
IV RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT AFTER WILLIAMS 
 
The first part of this Chapter outlines and illustrates the importance of the separation 
of powers and its implementation in separating the three arms of government of the 
Commonwealth of Australia. It is a cornerstone of the Constitution and of the 
function of the Australian system of government. The second and third parts together 
introduced the concept of representative and responsible government and, 
particularly, how the Constitution entrenches these aspects to establish how 
government action is held to account by the citizenry.  
 
Here, this paper argues that the traditional responsibility aspects of responsible 
government have been modified to suit the needs of contemporary Australian 
government. It does so as follows. First is a short discussion on a key aspect of 
responsible government: oversight of expenditure.137 Second, the paper argues that 
after Williams, responsible government now takes account of two considerations: 
federal considerations and accountability considerations.  
 
A Oversight of Expenditure 
	  
By way of background: there are functions specific to each House of Parliament and 
functions common to both Houses.138 Of the common functions, one, known as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 See generally: Aldons, above n 130. 
133 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ) – footnote omitted. 
134 Ibid 558-9. 
135 Elisa Arcioni, ‘Section 53 of the Constitution: An overlooked reference to the constitutional 
people’ (2013) 87 Australian Law Journal 784, 788. 
136 Weller, above n 62, 314. 
137 This is introductory and a substantive account will be provided in Chapter Four: III Williams, A 
Oversight of Expenditure. 
138 See: Aldons, above n 130, 36-8. 
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manifest legitimation, is described as ‘putting the parliamentary stamp of approval 
on decisions made elsewhere.’139 In this sense, it is Parliament’s assent, by way of 
legislation, to Executive decisions. This paper analyses this in the context of assent 
to Executive expenditure. As I will analyse in Chapter Four, key issues in the Pape 
and Williams cases concern what is necessary for Parliament to assent to expenditure 
in support of the impugned Executive activities. The focus is on whether an 
Appropriation Act is sufficient for Parliament’s, and therefore, the people’s, consent 
to expend to support executive activity, or whether supporting legislation, which 
expressly displays fully-informed parliamentary approval, is required. 
 
Executive expenditure has received judicial comment. In Egan v Chadwick, Priestley 
JA implies that ‘the expenditure of public money provided a criterion for the 
boundaries of executive activity subject to the scrutiny of Parliament.’140 His Honour 
provides that: 
 
[t]he entire conduct of the administration of the laws by the Executive is only 
possible by the use of people employed, in one way or another, by the Executive and 
by the use of assets of one kind or another, which may be publicly or privately 
owned but which in the latter case must be paid for. Every act of the Executive in 
carrying out its functions is paid for by public money. Every document for which the 
Executive claims legal professional privilege or public interest immunity must have 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Ibid 38. Aldons also characterises the media as forming a big part in the accountability of 
Parliament as there are direct links to the citizen: 39-40. 
140 Mantziaris, above n 131, 15.  
141 Egan v Chadwick [1999] NSWCA 176, [135] (Priestley JA) (Spigelman CJ and Meagher JA 
agreeing). 
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B Australian Constitutional Considerations 
	  
The concept of responsible government is recognised to adapt to the changing 
circumstances of government.142 Chapter Four argues that such a change began in 
Pape and developed in Williams.143 This part provides a summary. 
 
The paper argues that although the Court has accepted traditional aspects of 
responsible government,144 one outcome of the holding in Pape and Williams 
provided a more Australian focused meaning,	   145 particularly with regard to a two-
tiered federal, as opposed to a unitary, system of government. 
 
In upholding the plaintiff’s claim in Williams, the majority judgments placed 
emphasis on structural considerations on the Constitution, which look at federal 
considerations146 and accountability considerations.147 The combination of this is 
argued to be a reformulation on the ‘foundation of limitations on the Commonwealth 
Executive not previously appreciated.’148 This is particularly emphasised by 
Gummow and Bell JJ, as their Honours provide that ‘constitutional coherence is now 
key to understanding the Executive’s powers’.149 The two considerations refer to 
responsibility ‘both nationally and federally.’150 This paper argues that the national 
and federal considerations act as a limit on an expansion of the ambit of the 
Executive Power. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 71-2 (Deane and Toohey JJ); Australian Capital 
Television v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 230, 231 (McHugh J); Egan v Chadwick [1999] 
NSWCA 176 [15] (Spigelman CJ); Stellios, above n 48, 11-12, 548-9; Mantziaris, above n 131, 12. 
143 See Chapter Four: Controlling the Elusive: Responsible Government informing a limit on 
Executive Power. 
144 Outlined above in Part II Representative Government and Part III Responsible Government. 
145 Gabrielle Appleby and Steven McDonald, ‘Looking at the Executive Power through the High 
Court’s New Spectacles’ (2013) 35 Sydney Law Review 253, 274. 
146 Ibid 263-70. 
147 Ibid 270-2.   
148 Ibid 273. 
149 Ibid 273. 
150 Ibid 273. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE EXECUTIVE POWER 
 
 
This Chapter introduces the Executive Power of the Commonwealth. First, it traces 
the evolution of our present form of Executive Government from the concept of the 
Crown. Second, it introduces the Executive Government’s ability to act. Third, it 
establishes that the Executive Government is one of limited powers and explores 
why this is so. 
 
I THE EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
	  
The Executive Government of the Commonwealth is provided for in Ch II of the 
Constitution, suitably entitled ‘The Executive Government’. Much of the power on 
which the Executive Government relies is provided in s 61, that: 
 
The executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable 
by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative, and extends to the execution 
and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Commonwealth. 
 
Most power contained within s 61 was imported through the common law upon 
federation.151 An example is prerogative power.152 The recognition of this ancient 
and traditional power153 illustrates that the form of Executive Government in 
Australia today derives from the Crown in the Westminster system.  
 
A The Crown 
	  
An ample summary of the idea that is ‘the Crown’ is provided in Sue v Hill154 in the 
joint judgment of their Honours Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ. The following 
five paragraphs are adapted from pages 497-500 of the judgment. Their Honours’ 
summary is abridged as follows.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 I note that the status of the extent of prerogative power the Commonwealth of Australia received is 
subject to debate and is largely unclear. In a recent decision of the High Court - which did not decide 
the issue - it was indicated that the power received by the Commonwealth Executive upon federation 
is not plenary as that of the Executive of the United Kingdom due to, inter alia, that the 
Commonwealth of Australia is a federal system as opposed to a unitary system: Williams v 
Commonwealth (2014) 252 CLR 416, 469 [82]-[83] (French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 
Crennan J agreed with the comments of the plurality save for the subject of the litigation being 
characterised differently under s 51(xxiiiA): 471 [99]. 
152 Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 498 (Mason J). 
153 Sir John Comys, A Digest of the Laws of England, Vol VII (5th ed, 1826). 
154 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462.  
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First, the use of the term ‘the Crown’ identifies the body politic. In Australia’s 
system of government, the Executive comprises the Federal Executive Council, or 
cabinet, through which the Governor-General, sitting as the Head of State, 
undertakes Executive action upon the Council’s advice. It is the ‘ultimate decision 
making body of the government.’155 
 
Secondly, it identifies the office of which is the manifestation of the international 
personality of a body politic (described above), by whom and to whom diplomatic 
representatives are accredited and by whom and with whom treaties are concluded. 
Further, it is a corporation sole and has perpetual continuance.156 The Crown refers 
to the Monarch. Traditionally, the Monarch assents to legislation once it is passed 
through the Houses of Parliament. 157 This developed from the steady growth of 
Parliament’s authority in England. In short, once a Bill is passed through the House 
of Commons and the House of Lords, it is then presented to the Monarch for Royal 
Assent or veto. In Australia, assent is given by the Governor-General through its 
function as the Queen’s representative as provided by s 61 of the Constitution.158 In 
contemporary practice, particularly since the passage of the Australia Act, assent is 
no longer on behalf of the Queen and her Dominion, rather, solely on behalf of the 
Commonwealth of Australia.159 
 
Thirdly, the Crown identifies the government; that being the executive branch as 
distinct from the legislative branch.  
 
Fourthly, the use of the term ‘the Crown’ arose during the course of colonial 
development in the nineteenth century, identifying the paramountcy of the powers of 
the United Kingdom, the ‘parent state.’ 
 
Finally, the phrase ‘under the Crown’ in the preamble to the Constitution and ‘heirs 
and successors in the sovereignty of the United Kingdom’ in covering clause 2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 Suri Ratnapala, Thomas John, Vanitha Karean and Cornelia Kosh, Australian Constitutional Law: 
Commentary and Cases (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 222. 
156 Clark, above n 60, 210 [8.2]. 
157 Known as ‘Royal Assent’. 
158 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, 498 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
159 The effect of the Australia Act is discussed below at ‘C Transition to the Modern Day Executive’. 
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involves the use of the Crown as referring to ‘the Queen’160 – or the person 
occupying the hereditary office of Sovereign of the United Kingdom – or her heirs 
under the rules of succession of the United Kingdom.161 
 
B The Role of the Monarch in Australia 
 
The role of the Monarch is now largely ceremonial. As summarised by Blackshield 
and Williams, writing on the Executive Power’s exercise in the name of the 
Monarch: 
 
…the ceremonial jewelled headpiece is used as a metonymous figure of speech as a 
depersonalised symbol of the monarch, who is in turn treated as a personalised 
symbol of what in other constitutional systems is usually referred to as the State.162 
 
That power now, as noted,163 is exercised in Australia by the Governor-General as 
the Head of State on advice of the Federal Executive Council. As explained by 
Professor Corbett: 
 
[…] the prerogative powers of the Crown were personal powers of the Sovereign; 
and it was only by slow degrees that they were converted to the use of the real 
executive body, and so brought under control of Parliament. In Australia, however, 
those powers were never personal powers of the King […] in the scheme of colonial 
government, the powers of the Crown and the Prerogative really represent […] those 
paramount powers which would naturally belong to a parent State in relation to […] 
its dependencies…164 
 
Examining the historical role of the Monarch is important to establish that it is 
Parliament who provides a check to that Executive Power. This developed from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 In recognition of the fact that at federation, the Sovereign was her Majesty Queen Victoria. 
161 Note that as at 26 March 2015, following the Perth Agreement, the Succession to the Crown Act 
2013 (UK) is in force. It, inter alia, removed male-based primogeniture and provides for absolute 
primogeniture. If, for example, the first child of Prince William and Princess Catherine, the Duke and 
Duchess of Cambridge, was born on or after 26 March 2015 and was female, and then had a second 
child who was male, the Act provides that the first-born female will be the next in line to the throne 
after her father. 
162 Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory: Commentary 
and Materials (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2006) 520. 
163 See: Chapter Two: I Australia’s System of Government, B The Executive and above: I The 
Executive Government of the Commonwealth, A The Crown. 
164 Pitt Corbett, ‘The Crown as Representing the State’ (1904) 1 Commonwealth Law Review 145, 
146-7. 
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rise of parliamentary supremacy in the United Kingdom, where the Monarch was 
accountable to the House of Commons for the actions of the Crown. As discussed,165 
it is the case in Australia that the Executive is responsible to the Parliament. 
 
C Transition to the Modern Day Executive 
 
A distinction to draw from Professor Corbett’s quotation above is whether one refers 
to the office of the Crown or the ‘office holder’. As discussed, in the Australian 
system of government, we refer to the office holder as exercising the power, not the 
Sovereign itself.166 
 
Australian constitutional theory provides that the idea of the Executive now known 
arose ‘once the colonies acquired an element of self-government “under the 
Crown”’.167 As recognised in Engineers, at that time, the office of ‘the Crown [was] 
one and indivisible throughout the Empire, its legislative, executive and judicial 
power is exercisable by different agents in different localities…’168 This is known as 
the theory of ‘indivisibility of the Crown’. 
 
The theory of indivisibility of the Crown emerged to ensure that prerogative power 
was only exercised by the Crown – being the Monarch of the United Kingdom. This 
was because at that time there were both ‘British subjects’ and ‘subjects of the 
Queen’. Though textually distinct, the terms appear, prima facie, similar. A plain 
reading alludes that the former are citizens of the United Kingdom, as distinct from 
the latter, appearing to be any of her Majesty’s citizens across the Commonwealth 
Dominions. It is the case that the terms are used in parallel and, in effect, render the 
same meaning. A useful illustration is provided in Nolan v Minister for Immigration 
& Ethnic Affairs: 
 
The terms ‘British subject’ and ‘subject of the Queen’ were essentially 
synonymous. The British Empire continued to consist of one sovereign State 
and its colonial and other dependencies with the result [that] there was no 
need to modify either the perception of an indivisible Imperial Crown or the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 See: Chapter Two: I Australia’s System of Government: B The Executive. 
166 See: ibid.	  
167 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 860 [8.2.1]. 
168 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 152 (Knox 
CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ). 
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doctrine that, under the common law, no subject of the Queen was an alien 
in any part of Her Majesty’s dominions…169 
 
Following this was recognition of ‘the transition from Empire to Commonwealth and 
the emergence of Australia and other Dominions as independent sovereign nations 
within the Commonwealth’170 of nations. The transition was not instant and, prior to 
the discussion addressing the transition, it is helpful to refer to the comprehensive 
review of the history of the Executive Power to its present day form, as provided by 
Gageler J in Plaintiff M68-2015.171 Of significance, his Honour, quoting Professor 
Finn, provided: 
 
“Responsible government left unsevered the many constitutional links with the 
Queen. Even the royal power of veto of colonial legislation remained. And in each 
colony the Queen’s representative, the Governor, persisted as a fixture on the local 
stage. But also so did the Executive Council, a body hitherto formed of official 
appointees to advise the Governor in the exercise of the majority of his powers.”172 
 
Those ‘links’173 are: first, the Balfour Declaration; secondly, the Statute of 
Westminster; and thirdly, the Australia Acts. Over a 60-year period, each link was 
broken. In short, it involved the passage of legislation from the British Parliament, as 
the Imperial Government, providing more power to each of the Commonwealth 
Dominions. Beginning with the Balfour Declaration, each Dominion rose to have the 
same legislative power as the British Parliament. It continued with the Statute of 
Westminster, which provided that from then on, British Legislation would no longer 
bind on the Dominions. Finally, the Australia Acts, considered the final link to be 
broken, statutorily abolished appeals to the Privy Council and no longer bound the 
State Governments to legislation passed by the British Parliament. 
 
It is the result of these events that an independent Executive Government – that being 
wholly independent of the control and oversight of the United Kingdom – took form.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Nolan v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1988) 165 CLR 178, 183 (Mason CJ, Wilson, 
Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
170 Ibid 184. 
171 Plaintiff M68/2015 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 90 ALJR 297, 321-4 
[115]-[128] (Gageler J). 
172 Ibid 321 [116] (Gageler J). 
173 Though Gageler J refers to these as links, Professor Finn has referred to them as ‘ties’: see Paul 
Finn ‘A Sovereign People, A Public Trust’ in Finn (ed), above n 65, 1, and generally: Paul Finn, Law 
and Government in Colonial Australia (Oxford University Press, 1987). Each adjective refers to the 
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Each event is now developed 
 
1 The Balfour Declaration 
 
The Balfour Declaration occurred in 1926. It arose from a request of the Canadian 
Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Mackenzie King, following concerns of 
‘British influence’ in a Canadian political crisis,174 and the decision of the Privy 
Council in Nadan v R [1926] AC 482. The request was for an Imperial Conference 
and was attended, along with the Canadian Prime Minister, by the Prime Minister’s 
of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and South Africa. 
The Balfour Declaration provided that: 
 
Great Britain and the Dominions … are autonomous communities within the British 
Empire equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their 
domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the 
Crown…175 
 
Effectively, the Balfour Declaration announced that the Dominions of the 
Commonwealth were equal in power to that of the Imperial Parliament. 
 
2 The Statute of Westminster 
 
The second step, the adoption of the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK) arose after an 
Imperial Conference on Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation 
was held in 1929. A recommendation of the Imperial Conference was that the 
Imperial Parliament legislate to free the self-governing dominions from their ‘legal 
subservience to Imperial legislation.’176 The recommendations were taken to the 
1930 Imperial Conference of Dominion Prime Ministers and were endorsed. The 
Statute of Westminster provided, inter alia, that the Imperial Parliament ‘would enact 
new legislation in areas of Dominion constitutional responsibility only with the 
“request and consent” of their parliaments.’177 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Known as the ‘King-Byng’ affair, the crisis occurred when the Governor-General of Canada, the 
Lord Byng of Vimy, refused the request of Prime Minister King to dissolve Parliament and call a 
general election. 
175 Balfour Declaration, Report of Imperial Conference (1926) Cmd 2768. 
176 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 41 [1.2.13]. 
177 Ibid. 
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Australia adopted the Statute of Westminster in 1942 by passing the Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth). As provided by s 3, the Adoption Act applied 
retroactively to 3 September 1939. This was necessary so Australia could justify its 
use of war powers in World War II without committing war crimes under British 
law.178 
 
3 The Australia Acts 
	  
The third and final act that completed the separation of the links that bound Australia 
to the United Kingdom was the enactment of the Australia Act 1986. The process 
began in 1984 by an agreement of the Commonwealth and State governments to 
‘terminate the relics of the states’ colonial pasts.’179 Two methods were used in order 
to achieve this. First, a request, coupled with supporting legislation from the States 
and the Commonwealth, was made to the British Parliament to consent to and enact a 
Bill that contained the substantive provisions severing the final links between 
Australia and England. The enactment of a Bill by the British Parliament is said to 
have been passed ‘out of a perceived need for abundant caution’180 so to ‘ensure no 
argument could occur as to the validity of the arrangements.’181 The second method 
was for a Bill to be enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament at the request of all 
State legislatures under s 51(xxxviii) of the Constitution.182 
 
For the legislative sphere, the Australia Act terminated the British Parliament’s 
power to legislate for the States. Further, it gave the State Legislatures the power to 
legislate contrary to British legislation which previously had overriding force. This 
was provided for because s 2 of the Statute of Westminster did not apply to the 
States.183 For the Executive sphere, it provided that the powers and functions of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 It was more recently engaged in analysing the case in Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (1991) 172 
CLR 501. 
179 Clarke, Keyzer and Stellios, above n 11, 45 [1.2.21]. 
180 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, 491 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 
181 Stellios, above n 48, 459. 
182 Gabriel A Moens and John Trone, Lumb Moens & Trone: The Constitution of the Commonwealth 
of Australia Annotated (LexisNexis Butterworths, 9th ed, 2016) 24 [31]. Both methods were utilised as 
there was uncertainty in the scope of s 51(xxxviii). In 1999, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ 
commented that s 1 of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) had been validly enacted by the Commonwealth 
Parliament utilising s 51(xxxviii): Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 462, 491-2 [63]. 
183 Stellios, above n 48, 456. 
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Monarch in State matters are now vested in State Governors.184 In the judicial arena, 
appeals to the Privy Council were formally terminated.185 
 
Coming into force on 3 March 1986, the Australia Act marked the end of the legal 
sovereignty186 of the Imperial Parliament. The traditional monarchical executive 
power was now solely exercisable by the Cabinet of the Commonwealth of 
Australia187 and it was now recognised that ‘ultimate sovereignty resided in the 
Australian people.’188 
 
II THE BASES OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
	  
	  
The sparse and sometimes cryptic wording of s 61, the constitutional provision that 
vests executive power, has rendered elusive the goal of identifying a unified and 
judicially accepted theory for executive power.189 
 
Executive power is not defined within s 61 itself.190 Though the power has been 
analysed and discussed in numerous cases and academic articles, attempts at an 
exhaustive definition have been expressly avoided.191 Unlike s 51, the construction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Moens and Trone, above n 182, 25-6 [32]. 
185 Australia Act 1986 (Cth) s 11. Note that prior to this, in 1968 and 1975, the Commonwealth 
enacted legislation that limited appeals with respect to Commonwealth law and appeals from the High 
Court, respectively the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth) and the Privy Council 
(Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth). The High Court denied a s 74 certificate of appeal to 
the Privy Council in Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 2) (1985) 159 CLR 461 and 
provided ‘[A]lthough the jurisdiction to grant a certificate stands in the Constitution, such limited 
purpose as it had has long since been spend.’ [5] (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and 
Dawson JJ). For a comprehensive history, see Gleeson, above n 18, speech delivered in Sydney on 31 
May 2007. 
186 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (Mason CJ).	  
187 In a practical sense. 
188 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138 (Mason CJ). 
189 Andrew McLeod, ‘The Executive and Financial Powers of the Commonwealth: Pape v 
Commissioner of Taxation’ (2010) 32 Sydney Law Review 123, 123-4. 
190 George Winterton, ‘The Relationship between Commonwealth Legislative and Executive Power’ 
(2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 21, 24. 
191 See Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 226-7 [121] (Gummow and Bell JJ); Re 
Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391, 462-3 [220] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Michael 
Crommelin, ‘The Executive’ in Greg Craven (ed), The Convention Debates 1891-1898: 
Commentaries, Indices and Guide (Legal Books, Sydney, 1986) vol 6, 127, 147; P H Lane, Lane’s 
Commentary on the Australian Constitution (Law Book Co, 2nd ed, 1997) 434; Geoffrey Lindell, ‘The 
changed landscape of the Executive Power of the Commonwealth after the Williams case’ (2013) 
39(2) Monash University Law Review 348, 353.  Note the High Court expressed that the executive 
power had not been defined in Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 92 (Mason CJ, Deane and 
Gaudron JJ), 107 (Brennan J), and in the year 2000 ‘the scope of the power remains open to some 
debate’: R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535, 555 [39] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, 
Hayne and Callinan JJ); see generally: Winterton, above n 190, 24. 
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of s 61 ‘is not weighted down by a rich body of jurisprudence.’192 Judicially, it has 
been described as ‘generic’,193 and in commentary, as ‘notoriously elusive’.194 
Despite this, what has been identified analysis over the years are the aspects of 
executive power – or the bases on which the Executive acts. The bases of Executive 
Power, as French CJ provided in Williams, non-statutory power, prerogative power 
and power deriving from its status as a national government – the nationhood 
power.195 These will be discussed in turn. 
 
A Non-Statutory Power 
	  
The non-statutory aspect of the Executive Power refers to the Executive’s ability to 
act without legislation.196 This part of the discussion focuses on the aspect of non-
statutory power that is not recognised as prerogative or nationhood power. The 
ability to act by engaging prerogative or nationhood power will be discussed in turn 
below.197 
 
The Executive has a limited ability to act without legislation required to support the 
action or activity. In the text of s 61, text that is recognised as ‘meagre and highly 
abstract’,198 there are two phrases of significance. The first is ‘the execution and 
maintenance of this Constitution’. The second is ‘the execution and maintenance … 
of the laws of the Commonwealth.’ The former is simply defined as the 
‘Commonwealth’s ability to act in “execution” of the Constitution and federal 
laws.199 This pre-supposes an existing law that requires execution.200 The latter is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Hume, Lynch and Williams, above n 19, 91.	  
193 Le Mesurier v Connor (1929) 42 CLR 481, 514. 
194 Grant Donaldson, ‘Aspects of State Executive Powers’ (2013) 36(2) University of Western 
Australia Law Review 145, 145. 
195 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 184-5 [22] (French CJ). Note that this not to 
ignore the four classes his Honour identified in Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 
CLR 1, 60 [126]-[127]. It is unnecessary to comment on the executive power to ‘execute’ the laws of 
the Commonwealth as provided textually in s 61. Additionally, it is unnecessary to comment on other 
executive powers derived from other sections of the Constitution, for example, as Twomey notes, ss 
72 and 119. See: Twomey, above n 32, 316 at fn 21. 
196 Of course, the Executive can be delegated authority from Parliament to make subordinate 
legislation: see Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 
73. 
197 See: B Prerogative Power and C Nationhood Power. 
198 Winterton, above n 190, 25. 
199 Nicholas Condylis, ‘Debating the Nature and Ambit of the Commonwealth’s Non-Statutory 
Executive Power’ (2015) 39 Melbourne University Law Review 385, 386. With reference to 
Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421, 431-2 (Knox 
CJ and Gavan Duffy J). 
200 Martin Redish, The Constitution as Political Structure (Oxford University Press, 1995) 117.	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interpreted as ‘a power to act without legislative authorisation’.201 It is, therefore, 
referred to as non-statutory executive power202 and reflects ‘the absence of 
parliamentary approval.’203   
 
Prior to Williams, there was a long-standing assumption that the Commonwealth 
could act without legislation so long as the action could fall within Commonwealth 
legislative power. This is commonly referred to as Winterton’s ‘breadth’ conception 
of the executive power.204 This assumption is expressed in the AAP Case, as seen by 
Barwick CJ’s statement that ‘the executive may only do what has been or could be 
the subject of valid legislation.’205 The assumption has received treatment in both a 
number of cases heard prior206 and subsequent207 to the AAP Case and is the subject 
of considerable commentary.208 
 
Despite the force behind the opinion in the AAP Case, the Court in Williams held that 
this conclusion cannot be drawn from the AAP Case.209 Apart from delegated 
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204 George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General (Melbourne University 
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205 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 362 (Barwick CJ). See also 379 (Gibbs J), 396 
(Mason J) and 405-6 (Jacobs J). Note that the expression by Gibbs and Mason JJ is written in the 
negative, that the power ‘does not reach beyond’ rather than ‘extend to the limit of’ the legislative 
power. 
206 Joseph v Colonial Treasurer of NSW (1918) 25 CLR 32, 46-7 (Isaacs, Powers and Rich JJ); 
Commonwealth v Australian Commonwealth Shipping Board (1926) 39 CLR 1, 10 (Knox CJ, Gavan 
Duffy, Rich and Starke JJ); Attorney-General (Vic); ex rel Victorian Chamber of Manufactures v 
Commonwealth (1925) 52 CLR 533, 567 (Starke J); R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608, 
643-4 (Latham CJ); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Official Liquidator of E O Farley Ltd (in liq) 
(1940) 63 CLR 278, 321 (Evatt J).  
207 Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, 61 
(Barwick CJ), 113 (Aickin J); R v Duncan; Ex parte Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1983) 158 CLR 
535, 560 (Mason J); Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 94 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron 
JJ), 110 (Brennan J); Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 248 CLR 1, 59 [124] (French 
CJ), 83 [214] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).  
208 See: Michael Crommelin and Gareth Evans, ‘Explorations and Adventures with Commonwealth 
Powers’ in Gareth Evans (ed), Labor and the Constitution 1972-1975 (Heinemann, 1977) 24, 43; P H 
Lane, The Australian Federal System (Law Book, 2nd ed, 1979) 430-1; Leslie Zines, The High Court 
and the Constitution (Butterworths, 4th ed, 1997) 255; Peter Gerangelos, ‘Parliament, the Executive, 
the Governor-General and the Republic: The George Winterton Thesis’ in H P Lee and Peter 
Gerangelos (eds), Constitutional Advancement in a Frozen Continent: Essays in Honour of George 
Winterton (Federation Press, 2009) 189, 192, 195; Twomey, above n 32, 321; Peter Gerangelos, ‘The 
Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia: Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, 
“Nationhood” and the Future of the Prerogative’ (2012) 12(1) Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal 97, 104. 
209 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 180 [4], 187 [27] (French CJ), 232 [135] 
(Gummow and Bell JJ), 358 [544] (Crennan J).  
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legislative authority, the executive may not create law, only execute it.210 French CJ, 
for example, accepts that executive activity need not always rely on statutory 
authorisation, however, limits this to ‘the doing of all things which are necessary or 
reasonably incidental to the execution and maintenance of a valid law of the 
Commonwealth once that law has taken effect.’211 His Honour supports this with 
reference to statements in Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal that limit the autonomy 
of the executive to the ordinary course of administering government212 and action 
appropriate to its position in the Constitution,213 for example, ‘the administration of 
departments of State under s 64’.214 This has been further defined as ‘the ordinary 
services of government.’215Other examples are the power to enter into contracts or 
agreements, employ staff and own and convey property.216  Therefore, it includes 
‘salaries for public service employees, maintenance of buildings and equipment and 
other recurrent expenses.’217 Gummow and Bell JJ are unequivocal in rejecting the 
proposition that the executive power is co-extensive with legislative power,218 
because if it were so, it would ‘undermine the basal assumption of legislative 
predominance inherited from the United Kingdom and would distort the relationship 
between Ch I and Ch II of the Constitution.’219 Crennan J forcefully rejects the idea 
that the executive could do anything that could be characterised under a legislative 
head of power because it would resemble prerogative power.220 Finally, Hayne J, 
while not deciding on this point, specifically noted that as a result of Pape, the 
Executive Power of the Commonwealth ‘does not exist separate to and independent 
of the scope of the legislative power with respect to spending regarding every matter 
that the legislative power has competence over.’221 Though Williams represents an 
enormous shift from the position in the AAP Case, the position is by no means 
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410, 455 (McHugh J). 
213 Ibid 464 (Gummow J). 
214 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 191 [34] (French CJ). 
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decisively settled.222 Subsequent cases are required to clarify and solidify the 
position.  
 
B Prerogative Power 
	  
Traditionally, prerogative power is (or was) exercised by custom or necessity by the 
Monarch. It is loosely described as that ‘for which the law has made no provision.’223 
It is well established that the Commonwealth of Australia has prerogative power.224 
Prerogative power was imported into s 61 at federation225 and its use extends to 
singular and specific actions.226 Evatt J in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v 
Official Liquidator of E O Farley Ltd (in liq) provided three classes of prerogative. 
The first are executive prerogatives, such as the power to declare war, make peace, 
enter into treaties and establish Royal Commissions.227 The second pertain to certain 
preferences and immunities, such as being a priority creditor and immunity from the 
court process. The third are proprietary rights, such as precious metals, royal fish, 
treasure trove and ownership of the foreshore.228 
 
In keeping with its traditional origins, new prerogative powers cannot be created.229 
Existing prerogatives can adapt to modern circumstances;230 however, Winterton 
warns that Courts should exercise caution in doing so because ‘the line between 
adaption of an existing prerogative and the creation of a new power may be a fine 
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one’.231 It is conclusive that prerogative power does not establish broad areas of 
discretion within which the executive may do as it pleases.232 It is limited ‘to those 
powers that can be identified to historical use and which have not been subsequently 
abrogated by legislation.’233  
 
It is long acknowledged by the High Court ‘that the executive power of the 
Commonwealth includes the Crown’s prerogative powers which are appropriate to 
the Commonwealth’s constitutional sphere of activity.’234 It is in this way that the 
prerogative is limited to reflect the constitutional landscape of Australia: that of a 
federal, and not a unitary state.235 It affects the way the prerogative operates for the 
Commonwealth of Australia as distinct from the way the Royal Prerogative in the 
United Kingdom operates because it must take into account the inherent power of the 
State Executive.236 State Executive power is derived directly from the United 
Kingdom whose constitutional system is built on convention. This is in sharp 
contrast to the debated, refined and written rules of the Australian Constitution that 
provide for both a central Commonwealth and various State governments to operate 
concurrently, within their own respective roles. This is further supported by 
commentary, providing that the prerogative is not ‘at large and must be interpreted 
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CJ), 228-33 [125]-[137], 236-9 [150]-[159] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 253-4 [204]-[206], 258-9 [215]-
[216] (Hayne J), 347-8 [501]-[503], 352-3 [518]-[524], 355-8 [535]-[544] (Crennan J), 368-9 [577], 
370 [581], 373-4 [594]-[595] (Kiefel J). Cf Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship 
Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 152 (Knox CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ); Davis v Commonwealth 
(1988) 166 CLR 79, 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ); Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 
501 [30] (Black CJ). 
233 Twomey, above n 229, 14. 
234 Winteron, above n 190, 26. See fn 39: Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477 (Mason J); 
Johnson v Kent (1975) 132 CLR 164, 169 (Barwick CJ), 174 (Jacobs J); Victoria v Commonwealth 
(1975) 134 CLR 338, 405-6 (Jacobs J); Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93 (Mason CJ, 
Deane and Gaudron JJ), 108 (Brennan J); Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); Ex parte 
Defence Housing Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410, 424 (Brennan CJ), 438 (Dawson, Toohey and 
Gaudron JJ), 464, 474 (Gummow J). 
235 Sue v Hill (1999) 199 CLR 461, 501-3 [90]-[94] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also, 
Seddon’s phrase ‘…the prerogative powers “inherited”, so far as relevant and applicable to 
Australia…’: Nicholas Seddon, Government Contracts: Federal, State and Local (The Federation 
Press, 5th ed, 2013) 76 [2.11] – my emphasis. See also Sarah Joseph and Melissa Castan, Federal 
Constitutional Law – A Contemporary View (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2010) 157. Note, however, that 
English constitutional history remains influential in determining executive power, including 
prerogative power: Gerangelos, above n 208, 117. 
236 And given further legitimacy in time of tension by the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 28 & 29 
Vict c 63. See generally: Seddon, above n 235. 
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consistently with the imperatives of Australian federalism.’237 Viewing it otherwise 
would be contrary to Australia’s system of responsible government.238 
 
C Nationhood Power 
	  
The concept of ‘nationhood’ is unique to Australian Executive Power. It is not non-
statutory power. Nor is it characterised as prerogative power. It operates 
independently of these aspects of the Executive Power.239 Nationhood power is an 
implied power that stems from the Commonwealth of Australia’s existence and 
character as a national government.240 The most accepted description of the 
nationhood power is that of Mason J in the AAP Case, that: 
 
[T]here is to be deduced from the existence and character of the Commonwealth as a 
national government and from the presence of ss 51(xxxix) and 61 a capacity to 
engage in enterprises and activities peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation 
and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of the nation.241 
 
Its measure is by ‘reference to Australia’s status as a sovereign nation and by 
reference to the terms of the Constitution itself.’242 Its scope, however, is still 
unclear.243 
 
1 The History of the Nationhood Power 
	  
Though most of the jurisprudence on the nationhood power has been provided in the 
41 years since the AAP Case, the first half of the 20th century hinted at ‘an alternative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Gerangelos, above n 208, 106. 
238 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 147 (Knox 
CJ, Isaacs, Rich and Starke JJ); Commonwealth v Kreglinger & Fernau Ltd (1926) 37 CLR 393, 413 
(Isaacs J); Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 577-9 (Brennan CJ, 
Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ); Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 
CLR 156, 204 [58] (French CJ), 351 [515] (Crennan J). See also: Pape v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [127] (French CJ), 123 [335] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ); McLeod, above n 
189, 138; Cheryl Saunders, ‘The sources and scope of the Commonwealth power to spend’ (2009) 20 
Public Law Review 256, 261-2. 
239 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 543 [193] (French J). 
240 See Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 362 (Barwick CJ), 396 (Mason J), 406 
(Jacobs J); Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 93 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ), 103 
(Wilson and Dawson JJ), 111 (Brennan J); Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542 [191] 
(French J); Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [127] (French CJ), 83 
[214]-[215] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ). 
241 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 397 (Mason J). 
242 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 542 [191] (French J). 
243 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 48-9 [92] (French CJ); Twomey, 
above n 32, 327-42; Appleby and Webster, above n 63, 1164. 
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functional power lurking directly in s 61.’244 A somewhat faint idea of nationhood 
presented in R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry245 in which it was held that treaty 
implementation is valid when the treaty is bona fide246 and of international concern – 
though in this author’s view, such a process is more a function of Australian 
prerogative. More decidedly, after World War II, the judgments of Burns v 
Ransley247 and R v Sharkey248 provided the first engagement of nationhood power 
when enacting legislation against subversion and sedition. This led Dixon J in the 
Australian Communist Party Case to express that the power of nationhood confers a 
protective aspect, and reflected249 that: 
 
[h]istory and not only ancient history, shows that in countries where democratic 
institutions have been unconstitutionally superseded, it has been done not seldom by 
those holding the executive power. Forms of government may need protection from 
dangers likely to arise from within the institutions to be protected.250 
 
Preferring the view of the United States on this topic, his Honour quotes from 
Black’s American Constitutional Law251 that: 
 
[i]t is within the necessary power of the federal government to protect its own 
existence and the unhindered play of its legitimate activities.252 
 
From here, jurisprudence on the nationhood power lay stale for approximately 20 
years until Barton v Commonwealth.253 Casting a wider scope than the precise 
refinement in the AAP Case, Mason J commented on executive power in s 61 more 
generally, that the power: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Condylis, above n 199, 392 – referring to R v Kidman (1915) 29 CLR 425, 438 (Griffith CJ), 440 
(Isaacs J). 
245 R v Burgess; Ex parte Henry (1936) 55 CLR 608. 
246 Though this aspect of bona fides is likely displaced by the geographic externality principle: XYZ v 
Commonwealth (2006) 227 CLR 532. 
247 Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101. See 116 (Dixon J). 
248 R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121. See 148 (Dixon J). 
249 Peter Gerangelos, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia: Section 61 of the 
Commonwealth Constitution, ‘Nationhood’ and the Future of the Prerogative’ (Legal Studies 
Research Paper No 12/85, November 2012) Sydney Law School, 33. 
250 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 187 (Dixon J). See also 232 
(Williams J). 
251 Citations omitted. 
252 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 188 (Dixon J). 
253 Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477.  
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extends to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and of the laws of the 
Commonwealth. It enables the Crown to undertake all executive action which is 
appropriate to the position of the Commonwealth and to the spheres of responsibility 
vested in it by the Constitution. It includes the prerogative powers of the Crown, that 
is, the powers accorded to the Crown by the common law.254 
 
As provided at the beginning of this section,255 one year later in the AAP Case, 
Mason J provided what is to date the most accepted description of and test for an 
engagement of nationhood power.256 
 
2 Davis v Commonwealth  
	  
The nationhood power was again at issue in Davis v Commonwealth.257 The case 
concerned the validity of sections of the Australian Bicentennial Authority Act 1980 
(Cth)258 which, inter alia, created the Australian Bicentennial Authority for the 
purpose of commemorating the 200 years of Australia since settlement by the First 
Fleet in 1788. The Act further provided, inter alia, that the use of any ‘prescribed 
expressions’259 in connection with the sale or supply of goods, are prohibited without 
obtaining express permission of the Authority. The challenge arose when the 
plaintiff, Louis Edward Davis,260 was refused permission to sell t-shirts with the 
words ‘200 years of suppression and depression’. ‘1788’ and ‘1988’ bordered the t-
shirts. 
 
The Court ultimately held that ss 22261 and 23262 were invalid and that s 22(6)(d)(i) 
was invalid to the extent that it referred to the expression ‘200 years’.  
 
Of significance in this judgment was an acceptance of both of Mason J’s 
observations in Barton v Commonwealth and the AAP Case as referred above,263 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Barton v Commonwealth (1974) 131 CLR 477, 498 (Mason J). 
255 See: III The Bases of Executive Power C The Nationhood Power. 
256 In particular, Heydon J was critical of the defendants deliberate omission of the final 13 words 
(‘and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of a nation’) of Mason J’s nationhood test: 
Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 177-80 [511]-[518] (Heydon J). 
257 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79. 
258 Specifically, ss 6-18, 22, 23 and 25. 
259 Such expressions included ‘bicentenary’, ‘bicentennial’, ‘200 years’, ‘Australia’, ‘Sydney’, 
‘Melbourne’, ‘founding’, ‘first settlement’, ‘exposition, ‘expo’ and ‘world fair’. These terms could not 
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260 Along with Allan Santo and Ernie Creighton. 
261 Offensive goods.  
262 Any goods that offended against s 22 would be forfeit to the Commonwealth.  
	  
	   40	  
an extension to the effect that the status of the States were expressly captured within 
the definition. This was provided by Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ as follows: 
 
[T]he existence of Commonwealth executive power in areas beyond the express 
grants of legislative power will ordinarily be clearest where Commonwealth 
executive or legislative action involves no real competition with State executive or 
legislative competence.264 
 
Wilson and Dawson JJ took a cautious view of the nationhood power when 
reviewing the ‘protective’265 aspect, expressing that there is ‘nothing to support the 
notion that the Commonwealth Parliament has power to legislate with respect to 
anything it regards of national interest and concern.’266 With respect to Mason J’s 
‘character and status of the Commonwealth as a national government’ concept, their 
Honours viewed this as ‘an element to be considered in the construction of s 61 of 
the Constitution’.267 
 
Their Honours pointed out what was provided by Gibbs J in the AAP Case that ‘the 
growth of Commonwealth to nationhood did not have the effect of destroying the 
distribution of powers carefully effected by the Constitution.’268 
 
Finally, Brennan J provided that the nationhood power is twofold in that it has a 
protective aspect ‘against forces which would weaken it’, and an advancement aspect 
‘whereby its strength is fostered.’269 
 
3 What is ‘the nation’ 
	  
What then is the ‘nation’ which nationhood protects and advances? Brennan J 
provided a complete and historically based description that: 
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11 (Brennan J). 
264 Ibid 93-4 (Mason CJ, Deane and Guadron JJ). 
265 The ‘subversion’ and ‘sedition’ cases of Burns v Ransley (1949) 79 CLR 101; R v Sharkey (1949) 
79 CLR 121 and Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1. 
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…the Constitution did not create a mere aggregation of colonies, redistributing the 
powers between the government of the Commonwealth and the governments of the 
States. The Constitution summoned the Australian nation into existence, thereby 
conferring a new identity on the people who agreed to unite ‘in one indissoluble 
Federal Commonwealth’, melding their history, embracing their cultures, 
synthesizing their aspirations and their destinies. The reality of the Australian nation 




And, in effortlessly capturing the vision and aspiration of the Framers: 
 
 The end and purpose of the Constitution is to sustain the nation.271 
 
 
IV A POWER SO LIMITED: THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE POWER 
	  
	  
With ‘the nation’ in mind, the Constitution sustains the nation because the 
Constitution created one indissoluble Commonwealth that ‘will last indefinitely – 
perhaps until Australia loses independence after total defeat at the hands of a foreign 
power, or until human existence itself ends.’272  
 
A conclusion to draw from the discussion of responsible government (in Chapter 
Two) and Executive Power (above) is that the Constitution provides all that is 
needed for Australia to function as a nation.273 However, as much as the citizenry 
need the Constitution that establishes the functioning of the country, the Constitution 
needs the citizenry to trust in it and recognise its legitimacy as an institution, to pay 
taxes for revenue raising and to abide by the laws created thereunder. For example, 
access to the constitutional system of government is provided by the election of 
members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate by vote of the 
people.274 If the Australian populous did not elect anyone to the Parliament, no one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 Ibid 110 (Brennan J). See also: Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) 63 & 64 
Vict, Preamble, covering clause 3. 
271 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 110 (Brennan J). 
272 Heydon, above n 11, 12. 
273 See: Suri Ratnapala, ‘Fiscal federalism in Australia: Will Williams v Commonwealth be a phyrric 
victory?’ (2014) 33(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 63, 66, 71. 
274 See Constitution ss 7 and 24.	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could exercise the legislative powers of the Commonwealth in s 51, 52 or 122 of the 
Constitution, no executive government could be formed under s 61, nor Ministers of 
State be selected under s 64 and there would be no Federal Executive Council for the 
Governor-General to act in Council with, or take advice of, which would, of course, 
preclude appointments to Chapter III Courts. The Constitution and the citizenry 
require each other to survive.  
 
Responsibility of the function of Australia is directly effected by the election of 
representatives to Parliament. Access to the Executive arm of government, therefore, 
is a corollary of that election. The Executive as an institution is legitimised by the 
citizenry. If the Executive is seen as the head, then the citizenry, through Parliament, 
must surely be seen as the neck. Accountability must always be to the people. 
Executive power is, therefore, limited by reference to the people.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CONTROLLING THE ELUSIVE: RESPONSIBLE 
GOVERNMENT INFORMING A LIMIT ON EXECUTIVE POWER 
 
	   The control of the use of the executive power is not an easy project.275 
	  
	  
The Executive power has come to the forefront of constitutional litigation in the 
French Court over the better part of the last decade. Governmental activities that 
have engaged the executive power as a platform for activities have been litigated on 
their constitutional basis.276 This Chapter examines two recent cases that have 
refined the scope of the Executive Power of the Commonwealth: Pape and Williams.   
 
Before I begin, I pause to make the following observation and endorse the view of a 
prominent commentator, Anne Twomey. As Twomey noted, it may take decades of 
future cases to refine the new understanding of the Executive’s capacity to spend 
money and enter into contracts; and for the High Court to provide guidance through a 
‘comprehensible and logical set of principles and rules.’277  
 
The following discussion does not attempt to enter the debate to provide what that 
guidance is or should be. The discussion is instead aimed at persuading the reader 
that there is rationality in the argument that the principle of responsible government 






In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the Rudd-Labor Government, 
through the Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs, introduced the Tax Bonus for Working Australians Bill 2009 into the House 
of Representatives.278 The Bill’s purpose was to ‘immediately support jobs and 
strengthen the Australian economy during a severe global recession.’279 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Nick Seddon, ‘The interaction of contract and executive power’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 
541, 550. 
276 Of which I express no view on the merits of the activities. 
277 Twomey, above n 229, 9. 
278 The Bill was introduced on 4 February 2009. 
279 Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 4 February 2009, 175. 
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application of the Bill was to provide $7.7 billion of financial support280 to 8.7 
million taxpayers, through one-off payments from between $300 - $950, depending 
on the taxable income of the taxpayer in the year ended 30 June 2008. This original 
Bill was defeated in the Senate. A new Bill, entitled the Tax Bonus for Working 
Australians Bill (No 2) 2009, was introduced on 12 February 2009. The change 
between the two Bills was that the newly introduced Bill provided payments between 
$250 - $900 for taxpayers earning between nil and $100,000 in the year ended 30 
June 2008. A further Bill, the Tax Bonus for Working Australians (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill (No 2) 2009 was introduced simultaneously. 
 
Following the Second Reading speeches and parliamentary voting, the Bills received 
assent on 18 February 2009. They were entitled, respectively, the Tax Bonus for 
Working Australians Act (No 2) 2009 (Cth) and the Tax Bonus for Working 
Australians (Consequential Amendments) Act (No 2) 2009 (Cth). 
	  
Bryan Pape281 sued the Federal Commissioner of Taxation in the original jurisdiction 
of the High Court. Pape sought a declaration that the Tax Bonus Act was invalid and 
an injunction to prevent the payment he was entitled under the Act, in the sum of 
$250, being paid to him. 
 
First, this paper analyses the Pape Court’s treatment of ss 81 and 83. The view 
reached was unanimous. The analysis argues that this is a positive shift toward 
higher accountability and responsible government because it limits the ability of the 
Commonwealth to spend by reference to substantive legislative power, not political 
considerations. Secondly, the paper analyses the Court’s treatment of the executive 
power. The discussion is critical of the Court’s treatment of executive power, 
principally because of the conclusions drawn about the executive power without a 
clear explanation to how the power comes about. A key aspect of this criticism draws 
from Heydon J’s judgment. The analysis will develop an aspect of Heydon J’s 
judgment that implores a tighter conception of the nationhood power – one that can 
be traced to the structure of the Constitution. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Net. The gross package was $8.2 billion. The net figure is as a result of the legislative process. 
281 At that time a barrister and lecturer at the University of New England in Armidale, NSW. Now 
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B Appropriations: Sections 81, 83 and Parliamentary Accountability 
 
Pape reformulated the understanding of appropriation in its entirety. A long standing 
assumption that appropriations ‘for the purposes of the Commonwealth’ were to be 
found by reference to s 81 of the Constitution282 was decided to be incorrect. Before 
beginning on the discussion of ss 81 and 83 in Pape, it is prudent to establish what an 
appropriation is. 
 
1 What is an appropriation 
 
An appropriation is defined as: 
 
The segregation by Act of Parliament of a sum of money in the consolidated revenue 
fund for the purposes of expenditure by the government.283 
 
Further, an appropriation Bill is defined as: 
 
A proposed law which, when enacted, segregates but does not authorise the 
expenditure of money from the consolidated revenue fund for the purposes of 
government.284 
 
Finally, the fund referred to in the above definitions, the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund, is defined as: 
 
The fund into which all revenues raised or received by the Commonwealth are paid. 
No money may be withdrawn from the consolidated revenue fund except under 
appropriation made by law, so that the power to authorise expenditure by the 
Commonwealth is held exclusively by the federal Parliament.285  
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and Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156. 
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Further, while there is not unanimity on the precise composition of the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund,286 in broad terms, it is all monies received by the Commonwealth.287 
From the standpoint of funds that are expended by the Commonwealth, monies 
forming the Consolidated Revenue Fund – as constitutionally mandated - are ‘not 
expended except under the authority of Parliament.’288  
 
Therefore, an appropriation – the process of the withdrawal of money - as approved 
by its appropriation Bill,289 is the movement of monies which is sanctioned by ‘an 
Act by which parliament authorises the expenditure of moneys’290 of the 
Commonwealth. In viewing the mechanics of appropriation, the appropriation Bill 
‘earmarks’291 the funds in question, identifies it as the funds for expenditure and 
isolates it from the rest of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, while providing the 
authority to satisfy s 83 of the Constitution to allow those funds to be constitutionally 
withdrawn. 
 
(a) Types of appropriations 
 
There are two types of appropriations. First is an appropriation ‘for the ordinary and 
annual services of the Government, and for related purposes.’ It is given an ‘odd 
number’, for example, ‘Appropriation Act (No 1) 2016-2017 (Cth).292 Appropriations 
the subject of an ‘odd numbered’ appropriation Act include ‘salaries for public 
service employees, maintenance of buildings and equipment and other recurrent 
expenses.’293 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Northern Suburbs Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 555. 
287 Charles Lawson, ‘Re-Invigorating the Accountability and Transparency of the Australian 
Government’s Expenditure’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 879, 884. For a fulsome 
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generally: Enid Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Appropriations’ (1971) 4 Adelaide Law Review 145. 
288 Northern Suburbs Cemetery Reserve Trust v Commonwealth (1993) 176 CLR 555, 599 (McHugh 
J). 
289 To which I will refer interchangeably as appropriation Act. 
290 Campbell, above n 287, 153. Note that Campbell further provides, citing an opinion of Alfred 
Deakin as Commonwealth Attorney-General in 1901-1902, that ‘no particular form of words need be 
used for an Act to take effect as an appropriation. This certainly this cannot accord with the current 
view. 
291 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 411 (Jacobs J). 
292 For more information on what is an ‘ordinary annual service of the Government’, see above at 
Chapter Three, II The Bases of Executive Power, A Non-Statutory Power. 
293 Appleby, above n 215, 96. For more information ‘ordinary annual services of the Government’, see 
above at Chapter Three, II The Bases of Executive Power, A Non-Statutory Power. 
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Second is an appropriation ‘for certain expenditure, and for related purposes.’ It is 
given an ‘even number’, for example, Appropriation Act (No 2) 2016-2017 (Cth). 
Appropriations the subject of an ‘even numbered’ appropriation Act include: the 
construction of public works and buildings; the acquisition of sites and buildings; 
items of plant and equipment which are clearly definable as capital expenditure; 
grants to the States under s 96 of the Constitution; and new policies not authorised by 
special legislation.294 
 
(b) How to appropriate 
 
The above definitions and commentary295 assist to inform how appropriations are 
conducted. The leading juridical description is that of Viscount Haldane. His 
Lordship’s explanation is that: 
 
[N]o money can be taken out of the consolidated fund into which the revenues of 
that State have been paid, excepting under a distinct authorisation from Parliament 
itself.296 
 
His Lordship’s view has informed the High Court’s view on this principle.297 
 
In Australia, appropriation is the process by which money is drawn from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund.298 The process of drawing money from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund, through the mechanisms of ss 81 and 83 of the 
Constitution, are discussed next299. The following is a summary. First, s 83 of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 224 CLR 494, 573-4 [150] (Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ); Harry Evans (ed), Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice (CanPrint Communications Pty 
Ltd, 12th ed, 2008) 285-6. This practice is known as the ‘Compact of 1965’. It became practice in May 
1965 after an agreement between the Senate and the government as to what to what types of services 
would not be regarded as the ordinary and annual services of government (a reference to the 
constitutionally imposed inability of the Senate to amend an appropriation Bill for the ‘ordinary and 
annual services of government’: See Constitution s 53). See: Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 
CLR 156, 340 [472] (Crennan J). For more on the history of this, see Combet v Commonwealth (2005) 
224 CLR 494, 573-4 [150]-[152] (Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). See also Australia, 
Senate, Journals of the Senate, 1976-1977, No 82, 17 February 1977, 572. 
295 Campbell, above n 287, 145. 
296 Auckland Harbour Board v The King [1924] AC 318, 326. 
297 See Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1922) 
31 CLR 421; Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 195, 205 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and 
Toohey JJ). 
298 I italicise ‘process’ to highlight that it is not the action of the withdrawal in isolation, rather certain 
criteria that require fulfilment in order to complete an appropriation. 
299 See 2: Section 81 Pre Pape: The decision in AAP; 3 Pape: Reformulation of Appropriation and 4: 
Post-Pape: The new mechanics.	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Constitution requires an appropriation be ‘under law.’ This is a reference to 
appropriation Acts, as discussed above.300 Secondly, in order to be an appropriation 
under law to satisfy s 83 of the Constitution, the appropriation must be ‘for the 
purposes of the Commonwealth’, as provided by s 81 of the Constitution. The phrase 
‘purposes of the Commonwealth’ has been subject to differing interpretations and 
was recently settled by the Court in Pape.  
 
2 Section 81 Pre-Pape: The decision in AAP 
 
The AAP Case concerned what is referred to as a ‘line-item appropriation’. It was a 
challenge from the State of Victoria of the validity of an appropriation of $5,970,000 
of the Consolidated Revenue Fund by the Appropriation Act (No 1) 1974-1975 (Cth). 
The impugned ‘line-item’ comprised two sub-items in Item No 4 of Division 530 in 
the Second Schedule of the Appropriation Bill, the first being for ‘Grants to Regional 
Councils for Social Development’, and the second for ‘Developments and Evaluation 
Expenses’. Known as the ‘Australian Assistance Plan’, the aim was for the 
Commonwealth to assist in the development, at a regional level within a nationally 
coordinated framework, of integrated patterns of welfare services, complementary to 
income support programmes and the welfare-related aspects of health, education, 
housing, employment, migration and other social services.  
 
While the AAP Case ultimately turned whether or not the Australian Assistance Plan 
was supported by power reposed in the Commonwealth,301 it provided the High 
Court the opportunity to examine appropriations. 
 
Although the judgments are varied and the issue was not resolutely concluded,302 it 
appears the approach of Mason J was the principal view moving forward, namely 
that the purposes of the Commonwealth are to be found within the words of s 81 
itself303 and that is ‘for such purposes as the Parliament may determine.’304  Mason J 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 See: 1 What is an appropriation and (a) How to appropriate.  
301 The Court ultimately held that such a plan was outside the scope of Commonwealth power. 
302 Lawson, above n 287, 903. 
303 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 392 (Mason J) This was even so although earlier 
authority had provided that the power to appropriate was able to be provided if identifiable within a 
Commonwealth legislative power: Australian Woollen Mills v Commonwealth (1954) 92 CLR 424, 
454 (Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ). 
304 Ibid 396 (Mason J). 
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identified as support for this interpretation the powerful opinion of Latham CJ three 
decades earlier, that: 
 
…the provisions in s 81 can fairly be read as intended to mean that it is the 
Commonwealth Parliament, and not any court, which is entrusted with the power, 
duty and responsibility of determining what purposes shall be Commonwealth 
purposes…305 
 
What was provided was that ‘the Commonwealth had unrestricted authority to make 
grants to any recipient it chose, so long as an appropriation could be secured.’306 It 
was the case that engaging in an activity required constitutional authority – for 
example, legislative or executive power.307 
 
This view was maintained by a majority of the Court in Combet v Commonwealth,308 
to the effect that ‘the burden of properly elaborating the purposes of the 
Commonwealth [falls] squarely upon Parliament as a matter for Parliament to 
resolve’.309 Practically, it was a political decision for the government of the day. 
Necessarily this implies a subjective reasoning process, changing as often as the 
government. Therefore a purpose of the Commonwealth was anything that the 
government needed it to be – a political decision. As the Constitution is a federal 
document, the balance of power - including financial power – requires balance. 
Casting a wide and unpredictable scope of power is, in the words of one 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 256 (Latham CJ). 
McTiernan J also identified this passage at 138 CLR 338, 369. See also 384 (Stephen J), 410-11 
(Jacobs) and 417 (Murphy J). 
306 Saunders, above n 238, 258. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Combet v Commonwealth 224 CLR 494, 522 (Gleeson CJ), 477 (Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ). 
309 Lawson, above n 287, 904. Note that to resolve the ambiguity, the 1988 Constitutional 
Commission recommended amending s 81 to ‘allow appropriation of the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
for any purpose that the Parliament thinks fit’: see Australian Constitutional Commission, Final 
Report of the Constitutional Commission (1988) vol 2, 831. This would have had the effect of 
rendering s 81 non-justiciable: see 834. 
310 Twomey, above n 32, 343. 
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3 Pape: Reformulation of Appropriation 
 
The Court’s decision in Pape on the mechanics of appropriations resulted in a 
number of changes in the way an appropriation is conceived.311 Appleby stated 
almost presciently when writing just prior to the Pape decision, that s 81 ‘is not a 
power at all but a parliamentary fiscal supervision mechanism’.312 The reasons of the 
holding in Pape are as follows. 
 
First, the Court unanimously held that ss 81 and 83 of the Constitution do not confer 
substantive power to spend.313 Section 81 merely regulates the relationship between 
the Executive and the Parliament, by providing ‘control by the Parliament over 
purposes to which the Consolidated Revenue Fund may be applied’ and s 83 
‘regulate[s] withdrawal of money from the Treasury of the Commonwealth.’314 An 
appropriation ‘acts as a parliamentary control on the allocation and expenditure of 
public funds.’315 It does not, as Heydon J robustly states, give the Commonwealth 
‘untrammelled power to spend.’316 This is highlighted by the fact that ‘[i]t appears in 
a chapter that is not concerned with the bestowal of powers alongside provisions that 
stipulate the manner in which public moneys may be expended.’317 To find the 
purpose of the Commonwealth, one must find its source ‘in some other head of 
Commonwealth legislative power.’318 The legislative powers are substantive powers 
of the Commonwealth. Such powers derive from: 
 
the exercise of the legislative powers of the Commonwealth. It may also be an 
element or incident of the executive power of the Commonwealth derived from s 61, 
subject to the appropriation requirement and supportable by legislation made under 
the incidental power in s 51(xxxix).319 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 As the Court unanimously held, albeit in separate decisions, that ss 81 and 83 of the Constitution 
do not provide a substantive power to spend, the discussion that follows draws from each judgment to 
create the argument. 
312 Appleby, above n 215, 112, 123.  
313 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 55 [111] (French CJ), 73 [178], 78 
[197], 80 [202], 82-3 [209]-[210] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ), 105 [296] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ), 
211 [602] (Heydon J). 
314 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 113 [320] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
315 McLeod, above n 189, 127. 
316 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 210 [601] (Heydon J). 
317 McLeod, above n 189, 127. 
318 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 211-12 [603] (Heydon J). 
319 Ibid 55 [111] (French CJ). 
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As a result, the ‘appropriations power’ is now only ‘the Parliament’s ability to confer 
authority on the Executive to spend moneys from the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund.’320 
 
Further, this had the important effect changing the reference point of a ‘purpose of 
the Commonwealth’. Originally thought to be any purpose(s) that Parliament thinks 
fit, it is now limited to ‘the purposes otherwise authorised by the Constitution or 
statutes made under the Constitution.’321  
 
The shift of reference point of a ‘purpose of the Commonwealth’ had many 
significant consequences for the Commonwealth’s power to spend. First, it confined 
the scope to one that was originally near unlimited to one that is confined to the 
ambit of the powers provided to the Commonwealth. These powers, important to 
responsible government, are the powers that were drafted and debated during the 
Convention Debates and refined into the powers they are today. Secondly, it now 
gives ‘minimal significance’322 to the power of an appropriation Act, as it now is 
recognised as only a withdrawal mechanism, rather than conferring substantive 
power itself. Pape himself, speaking at a conference in 2010, was critical of the High 
Court in saying that ‘the High Court has given the executive a magic genie, but no 
criteria how it is to be used, let alone stopped’.323 Lynch points out the factor that 
‘this new genie labours under restrictions that the one previously thought to lurk in 
the lamp of s 81 did not.’324 Those restrictions appear to be, inter alia, based on 
accountability to the Parliament by the legislative power reposed on Parliament. This 
significantly reduces and constrains the scope of the power to spend.325 This can be 
illustrated in the following way. In modern Australian politics, the government of the 
day holds a majority of the House of Representatives.326 As a result, the 
‘government’ (the Executive) comprises both the executive and legislative arms.327  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 McLeod, above n 189, 128. 
321 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 55-6 [113] (French CJ). 
322 Duncan Kerr, ‘Pape v Commissioner of Taxation: Fresh Fields for Federalism?’ (2009) 9(2) 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 311, 313. 
323 Bryan Pape, ‘Stopping Stimulus Spending, or is the Sorcerer’s Apprentice Controlling the 
Executive’, Third Sir Harry Gibbs Memorial Oration, 6. 
324 Andrew Lynch, ‘Commonwealth Financial Powers – Taxation, Direct spending and Grants – 
Scope and Limitations’ [2011] University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series 23, 
[17]. 
325 McLeod, above n 189, 140.	  
326 Martin Lumb, ‘Composition of the 44th Parliament’ Parliamentary Library Briefing Book – Key 
issues for the 44th Parliament (Commonwealth of Australia, 2013) 5 
327 Without taking account of the Senate. 
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Under the AAP Case and Combet conception of ‘purposes of the Commonwealth’ the 
government had carte blanche to decide what a ‘purpose of the Commonwealth’ was 
when appropriating. Under the Pape reformulation, the limitation is provided for by 
the fact that a purpose of the Commonwealth is restricted to what is within 
Commonwealth power.328 Therefore, the Commonwealth cannot utilise the 
withdrawal mechanism unless it is for a Commonwealth purpose. A Commonwealth 
purpose is limited to the breadth of the legislative powers of ss 51, 52 or 122 of the 
Constitution, or the combination of ss 61 and 51(xxxix) of the Constitution.   
 
4 Post-Pape: The new mechanics 
 
Broadly speaking, the mechanics of an appropriation as a result of Pape are as 
follows. As is constitutionally entrenched, the Commonwealth cannot withdraw 
money from the Treasury unless there is an ‘appropriation made by law’.329 That 
appropriation is in the form of an appropriation Bill. In order for an appropriation 
Bill to be lawful, the appropriation must be ‘for the purposes of the 
Commonwealth’.330 To determine ‘purpose(s) of the Commonwealth’, a purpose 
must be within Commonwealth power by reference to the enumerated legislative 
heads of power the Commonwealth possess, or by the combination of the 
Commonwealth’s executive power coupled with the incidental power. This 
ostensibly means that the Commonwealth cannot spend money on something it does 
not have the power to legislate with respect to. Admittedly, the breadth of 
Commonwealth legislative power is extensive.   
  
While the controversy of the breadth of legislative power has been settled for 
roughly a decade,331 the breadth and scope of the executive power is far from settled. 
In fact, following Pape, more unsettled than ever.332 
 
C Executive Power 
 
The view that the Executive Power extended to support the Tax Bonus Act was held 
by the barest of majorities (4:3) and commentators are generally critical of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 And further dispels any doubt as to whether a purpose of the Commonwealth is justiciable. 
329 Constitution s 83. 
330 Constitution s 81.  
331 See: New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1. 
332 Saunders, above n 238, 260. 
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Court’s findings as the Court appeared to state a conclusion why the Executive 
Power supported the Act without explaining why.333 This paper examines the 
judgments in turn. 
 
1 French CJ 
 
One commentator in particular is ‘devastating’334 in critique, and focuses on French 
CJ’s conception of executive power, specifically with regard to his Honour’s support 
of a nationhood power ‘outside of the prerogatives and the capacities of the Crown’, 
that are ‘not to be treated as a species of the royal prerogative’.335 His Honour’s 
reasoning was that ‘the collection of statutory and prerogative powers and non-
prerogative capacities [form] part of, but [do] not [complete], the executive power,336 
because s 61 ‘has to be capable of serving the proper purposes of a national 
government.’337 The nature of the additional power was left unexplained’.338 
 
The ‘inherent’ power, unlike the prerogative does not have definable limits.339 The 
lack of definable limits can have dire consequences for responsible government. This 
is because question of a ‘proper purpose’ of a national government is a political as 
opposed to legal question, which has the potential to create barriers of non-
justiciability. Allowing an ambiguous area of power such as this unchecked has the 
potential to open a wide range of activities to the Commonwealth – particularly if 
policies are skilfully drafted. 
 
Additionally, his Honour confirmed that the nationhood power is an ‘implied head of 
legislative competence’340 which leads legislative power, in this case, s 51(xxxix).341 
This is inconsistent with responsible government because responsible government 
necessitates that it is for Parliament to be able to ensure that executive power is 
subject to legislative control.342  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 See eg: Twomey, above n 32; McLeod, above n 189; Lynch, above n 324. 
334 Lynch, above n 324, [12]. 
335 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540 [183] (French J). 
336 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 60 [127] (French CJ). 
337 Ibid 59 [125], 60-1 [128] (French CJ). 
338 Twomey, above n 32, 332. 
339 Gerangelos, above n 208, 106, 122. 
340 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63-4 [133] (French CJ). 
341 Saunders, above n 238, 261-2. 
342 Gerangelos, above n 208, 114. 
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Further, French CJ reasoned that whether a matter falls within part of the nationhood 
power is determined by whether or not it is peculiarly within the capacity and 
resources of the Commonwealth.343 The approach appears to focus on fiscal might 
and not by reference to powers referable within the Constitution. Therefore, by 
comparison to the ‘Indian rope trick’, Twomey concludes that Pape ‘has left an 
implied executive nationhood power floating untethered above the Constitution, to 
be used in the future as a justification for Commonwealth legislation on anything that 
the Commonwealth regards as an “emergency” that it considers can be best 
addressed by the Commonwealth financial power. It is one more step away from a 
federation towards Commonwealth hegemony.’344 
 
2 Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ 
 
The plurality judgment is somewhat tighter than that of the Chief Justice in their 
treatment of the Executive Power. Their Honours state that ‘the executive power of 
the Commonwealth enables the undertaking of action appropriate to the position of 
the Commonwealth as a polity created by the Constitution and having regard to the 
spheres of responsibility vested in it’.345 However, when accepting that the executive 
power protects the body politic of Australia,346 their Honours qualify that 
Parliament’s ability to legislate by enlivening the executive power347 ‘does not mean 
that it may do so in aid of any subject which the executive government regards as of 
national interest and concern.’348 Effectively, that executive power is limited by the 
Constitution and its distribution of power.349  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
343 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 63-4 [133] (French CJ). 
344 Twomey, above n 32, 343. 
345 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 83 [215] (Gummow, Crennan and 
Bell JJ). This is with apparent approval of Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW): Ex parte 
Defence Housing Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410, 464 (Gummow J) and Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 
119 FCR 491, 540 (French J). 
346 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 111 (Brennan J). Also accepted by French CJ at 
(2009) 238 CLR 1, 59 [125] and 60-1 [128]. 
347 By engaging s 51(xxxix). 
348 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 87-8 [228] (Gummow, Crennan and 
Bell JJ) – emphasis added. 
349 This is not to say that their Honours are ‘limiting’ the ambit of the executive power, rather, 
providing that it is inherently limited. Their Honours opine that the executive power to respond to a 
crisis of this kind (or war, or natural disaster) and of this scale is derived directly from the Executive 
Power of the United Kingdom: 89 [233]. Arguably, one could view their Honours’ opinion is to the 
effect that the Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia is as powerful as the Executive 
Power of the United Kingdom. At the time of Pape, this may have been so, although it appears that 
this is no longer the case. As Bell J joined in the joint judgment of Williams v Commonwealth (2014) 
252 CLR 416, at 469 [82], [83] which loosely stands for the proposition that the executive power of 
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Their Honours focus on the ‘emergency’350 in question – recognising the 
circumstances of the global economic downturn to amount to a ‘global financial and 
economic crisis’351 - and opine that the Executive Government is the appropriate arm 
of the government to deal with this issue, because of the ‘roots’ of ‘the executive 
power exercised in the United Kingdom’ dealt with emergencies.352 This assessment 
of the status of the prerogative in s 61 arguably considers that the Executive Power is 
equal with to the Executive Power that the United Kingdom exercised over 
Australia.353 Here, their Honours suggest that the power with which the United 
Kingdom could act on behalf of Australia was transferred to Australia upon assent to 
the Australia Acts. Critically, this comes ‘perilously close to stating conclusions 
without disclosing the underlying reasoning.’354 Without a tracing to its source, it is 
difficult to control the ambit of the power. 
 
3 Hayne and Kiefel JJ 
 
The joint judgment, while noting that the executive power is not bounded by express 
grants of legislative power355 due to its ability to act through non-statutory, 
prerogative and nationhood powers, finds that the ambit of executive power ‘is not 
unlimited and … its content does not reach beyond the area of responsibilities 
allocated to the Commonwealth by the Constitution.’356 Further, their Honours 
unequivocally reject the proposition that the executive power recognised in s 61 is 
the same as the executive power of the United Kingdom at the time of Federation,357 
and give greater weight to the proposition that any exercise of executive power must 
take account of the spheres of responsibility vested in each arm of government 
through each respective chapter of the Constitution.358 The ability to account for the 
executive power by reference to powers entrenched within and across the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
although not settled, it does cast the former proposition into doubt. Crennan J agreeing at 471 [99]. 
Gummow J had retired from the Court in 2012 and was replaced by Gagler J – who of course did not 
participate in either of the Williams cases as he was the Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth and 
appeared for the Commonwealth in Williams. 
350 And do conclude that it is a ‘crisis’ 
351 McLeod, above n 189, 134. 
352 Saunders, above n 238, 261.  
353 Ibid 262. Known as the ‘Lockean view’ of the prerogative power. 
354 McLeod, above n 189, 137.	  
355 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 103 [290] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
356 Ibid 115-16 [327] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
357 Ibid 119-20 [336]-[339] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
358 Twomey, above n 32, 343. 
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Constitution provides greater control and oversight by Parliament, particularly by 
being better informed when it comes to releasing funds to support expenditure for 
programs and activities which rely on executive power as the source. This view is 
supported by their Honours’ reasoning that when a ‘crisis’ is claimed, the Court ‘may 
be required to examine the constitutional facts on which it is based’ to examine if a 
‘crisis’ is actually met.359 This demonstrates that their Honours did not wish the 
executive power to become self-defining.360 Necessarily, this requires the executive 
power to be accountable. 
  
Here, their Honours diverge from the majority361 because: 
 
the mere fact that only the Commonwealth had the administrative and financial 
resources to provide a “tax bonus” in response to such a crisis or emergency did not 
mean that s 61 applied … Section 61 could not be relied upon merely because the 
provision of a ‘tax bonus’ was viewed by the Executive as more convenient.362  
 
This significantly limits attempts at broad use of Executive Power. Passing a 
threshold question such as this does affirm the view that the Executive Power must 
be exercised in limited circumstances because it promotes the idea that the executive 
does not have carte blanch power to do as it pleases in ‘the execution and 
maintenance of this Constitution’. Rather, the appropriate circumstances must arise 
for the unique executive powers to be exercised in lieu of the entrenched and well 
defined legislative powers of the Commonwealth. 
 
4 Heydon J 
 
Heydon J’s conception of the rule of law is the tightest of the Court in Pape. His 
Honour’s analysis is extremely detailed; each Commonwealth submission is 
considered, carefully, logically and with precision. His Honour displays is reluctant 
to accept the existence of any implied executive power, for example, while 
recognising that ‘there is a power to legislate in relation to exploration;363 science 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Saunders, above n 238 262. 
360 Gerangelos, above n 208, 115. 
361 French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ.	  
362 David Thomas, ‘Commonwealth power and the fiscal stimulus’ [2009-2010 Summer] Bar News 
28, 29. 
363 Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 362 (Barwick CJ), 413 (Jacobs J). 
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and technology;364 research;365 inquiries and advocacy into matters affecting public 
health;366 inquiries, planning and coordination on a national scale367 and national 
initiatives in science, literature and the arts[,]368 how this power can be recognised 
has not been explained.’369 In Pape, one issue was whether or not there was an 
implied executive power to manage the national economy. His Honour held there 
was no such implied power as there are ‘extensive powers to do this.’370 
 
Regarding the nationhood power, Heydon J criticised the Commonwealth for their 
submissions on Mason J’s nationhood test.371 The Commonwealth omitted the final 
13 words of the test: and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the benefit of the 
nation. His Honour was not prepared to let the executive power slip out of a referable 
grasp into a realm where it is for the government to decide what is for the ‘purpose 
of the nation’ as opposed to this being done by reference to the Constitution. 
 
Ultimately, his Honour did not recognise that the nationhood power supported the 
Tax Bonus Act because there were two other methods that could have achieved the 
fiscal stimulus of the Tax Bonus Act. The first, either a lowering of tax or an increase 
in tax rebate.372 The second, an act of cooperative federalism by s 96 grant, with the 
condition that the States distribute the grant money to the citizens of the State.373 His 
Honour appears very conscious of the need to contain the executive power and to 
ensure that before turning to undefined powers, it is of critical importance to the 
nature of the federation to ensure that every enumerated option is canvassed and 
exhausted first. For responsible government, this ensures that Parliament is able to 
scrutinise these decisions. This is highlighted by his Honour stating ‘the mere fact 
that controlling economic crises is a matter of national interest does not lead to the 
conclusion that the Commonwealth has any power to control them apart from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Ibid 362 (Barwick CJ), 397 (Mason J). 
365 Ibid 413 (Jacobs J). 
366 Ibid 397 (Mason J). 
367 Ibid 412 (Jacobs J). 
368 Davis v Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79, 111 (Brennan J). 
369 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 175 [506] (Heydon J). 
370 Ibid 176-7 [509] (Heydon J), for example: ss 51(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (ix), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xvi), 
(xvii), (xix), (xx), (xxvii), (xxix), (xxxi) and (xxvii), 90, 96 and 115. 
371 See Chapter Three: III The Bases of Executive Power, C Nationhood. Note in particular, his 
Honour’s criticism is also derived from the significant support Mason J’s conception has received and 
the basis on which it came to be, particularly the pioneering nationhood power jurists: Australian 
Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 187-8 (Dixon J); Davis v Commonwealth 
(1988) 166 CLR 79, 111 (Brennan J). 
372 Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 176 [513] (Heydon J).  
373 Ibid 178-9 [515]-[518] (Heydon J). 
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powers expressly granted to it.’374 His Honour observes that the specificity of these 
provisions disprove the proposition of a wide implied power to manage the national 
economy because there is no synergistic relationship created by aggregating heads of 
power.375 
 
D The nationhood power: Responsibility is required 
 
Heydon J’s dissent from the majority view is more extreme than that of Hayne and 
Kiefel JJ. His Honour’s view is that the Executive Power must be ‘tethered’ to the 
Constitution rather than floating above it. Heydon J found that the nature of the 
Executive Power appeared ‘inherently subjective’ and ‘unsuitable to adjudicate’.  
 
This is at odds with French CJ’s understanding of the nationhood power is that it 
‘completes’ the arsenal of the Executive Power. If this is so, it must be able to be 
referable to the Constitution in order for it to be appropriately scrutinised by 
Parliament. The power must be able to be traced back to the Constitution, rather than 
concluding that it is within s 61. If not, there is no responsibility of the Executive 
when exercising the power and no accountability to the people – those whose monies 






The plaintiff, Ronald Williams, challenged the validity of expenditure under a 
contract made by the Commonwealth with a private service provider, Scripture 
Union Queensland (SUQ), for the delivery of ‘chaplaincy services’ into schools 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Ibid 174 [504] (Heydon J). To see his Honour’s opinion of this in detail – which this author 
recommends – see: 168-77 [487]-[510]. 
375 Ibid 176-7 [509] (Heydon J). Hayne and Kiefel JJ also recognise this: 125 [360]. Heydon J 
elaborates on this further when saying that it is a ‘fallacy’ suggest that the executive power to enact 
valid legislation pursuant to s 51(xxxix) is ‘more extensive than that which which could have been 
enacted under s 51(i)-(xxviii)’: 198 [564] and provided, by way of example, that if the Executive 
Power of the Commonwealth could be used to make payments independently of s 96, the 
Commonwealth could bypass the restrictions of ss 51 and 52’: 199 [569]. Further, Heydon J places 
reliance on Barwick CJ in the AAP Case that although it ‘couldn’t be denied that the economy of the 
nation is of national concern[,] no specific power over the economy is given to the Commonwealth. 
Such control as it exercises on that behalf must be effected by indirection through taxation, including 
customs and excise, banking, including the activities of the Reserve Bank and the budget… [t]he 
national nature of the subject matter, the national economy, cannot bring it as a subject matter within 
Commonwealth power.’: (1975) 134 CLR 338, 362. 
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operated by the Queensland State Government.376 The delivery of chaplaincy 
services was funded by the National Schools Chaplaincy Programme (NSCP). The 
plaintiff’s standing derived from the provision of services to the Darling Heights 
State School, Queensland, where his children attend as students.  
 
The Darling Heights State School received a funding agreement after lodging an 
application on 4 April 2007. The application was successful. Its stated purpose was 
‘the provision of funding under the NSCP on behalf of Darling Heights State 
School.’377 As a result, the agreement required that SUQ provide chaplaincy services 
in accordance with the application for funding.378 
 
The Commonwealth submitted that the expenditure met the necessary condition of a 
parliamentary appropriation for each year it was made. However, it was the case that 
‘no Act of Parliament conferred power on the Commonwealth to contract and expend 
money in this way. The Commonwealth relied upon the executive power under s 61 
of the Constitution.379 
 
One issue raised in this case was the ‘extent to which the executive power authorises 
the Commonwealth to make contracts and spend public money.’ This was raised 
because, due to the reasons of the Court in Pape, the Court held, despite a long-
standing assumption, that parliamentary appropriation is not a source of spending 
power.380 
 
The Court held 6:1 that the NSCP was invalid. The paper analyses two submissions 
put by the Commonwealth. The first, the broad basis submission, asserted that the 
Executive’s power to contract and spend is equivalent to that of a juristic person; in 
effect, it was unlimited.381 The second, the narrow basis submission, argued that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179 [2] (French CJ). 
377 Ibid 183 [15] (French CJ). 
378 It is not relevant to articulate the specific element noted by French CJ at 248 CLR 183 [17]. 
379 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179 [2] (French CJ). 
380 Ibid. 
381As summarised by Hayne J: It was submitted by the Commonwealth that the ‘capacities’ of the 
executive to spend money lawfully available to it, or enter into a contract: do not involve interference 
with what would otherwise be the legal rights and duties of others. Nor does the Commonwealth, 
when exercising such a capacity, assert or enjoy any power to displace the ordinary operation of the 
laws of the State or Territory in which the relevant acts take place. To amplify and provide support for 
this proposition, the Commonwealth parties further submitted that neither s 51(xxxix) (the incidental 
power) nor s 96 (the grants power) required some other conclusion: Ibid 243 [177]. 
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Executive could take any action that could be the subject of legislation, so long as 
there was valid appropriation supporting expenditure. 
 
This section analyses each submission separately, analysing and commenting on the 
separate judgments. It is difficult to draw a ratio from Williams as each judgment has 
a slightly different focus.382 The paper does not attempt to draw one here, although it 
does draw together holistically what Court said.383 
 
The following analysis is conducted by reference to the responsible government 
considerations discussed in Chapter Two, Part IV. They are first, oversight of 
expenditure, and secondly, Australian constitutional considerations. 
 
B Oversight of Expenditure 
 
The oversight of expenditure considerations largely informed the rejection of the 
Commonwealth’s broad basis submission. The Court commented at length on the 
nature of the Executive government’s contractual capacities and, critically, the 
importance of Parliament in the appropriation process. The paper argues that the 
limit imposed on contractual capacities are informed by the importance of Parliament 
in the appropriation process, because responsible government considerations require 
proper scrutiny of expenditure. That is, the contractual capacities of the Executive 
government are limited because expenditure requires the appropriation process 
which is conducted by Parliament. 
 
1 Contractual capacities 
 
Contractual capacity in Williams was concerned not with capacities in the contractual 
sense, rather, whether there was a limit on the Executive’s power to make a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 Literature prior to Williams notes that ‘[i]t has become something for a pattern for cases 
concerning the validity of Commonwealth appropriation and expenditure to lack a clear ratio 
decidendi’: McLeod, above n 189, 124. 
383 The case did not raise issues about the executive acting within the scope of a prerogative: see 
Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 216-17 [83] (French CJ). There was some discussion 
of a nationhood power, however the Court unanimously rejected that this power could be engaged: see 
Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 216-17 (French CJ), 235 [146] (Gummow and Bell 
JJ), 267 [240] (Hayne J), 319 [402] (Heydon J), 348 [503] (Crennan J); 373 [594] (Crennan J). As 
such, an analysis of these powers will not form a substantive part of this analysis; they will be referred 
to when necessary to outline arguments of responsible government. 
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contract.384 The limit must take account of three fundamental factors. First, as the 
Executive government is a polity, it expends public, as opposed to private, money.385 
Secondly, the Parliament, a separate branch of government than, is vested with the 
exclusive power of raising and expending money, which provide ‘carefully crafted 
checks’ of parliamentary control. Finally, Parliament itself has limited powers due to 
the distribution of power across the Constitution. A corollary is that the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund cannot be spent as the Executive chooses’ because it is Parliament 
that has exclusive control over the Consolidated Revenue Fund.386 
 
Governmental capacity to contract is not dependent on assumptions about capacity; it 
is determined through constitutional interpretation.387 Such interpretation provides 
that it is the function of the Executive, rather than Parliament, to make contracts. 
This is made clear as follows: the Executive has power offer, accept and, as a 
corporation sole388 has the requisite capacity to form intention to create legal 
relations. Further, it does have the power to offer consideration in the sense that 
Dixon J described in Bardolph as ‘contracting for the expenditure of moneys’.389  
 
The Executive, however, is: 
 
answerable politically to Parliament for their acts in making contracts. Parliament is 
considered to retain the power of enforcing the responsibility of the Administration 
by means of its control over the expenditure of public money.390 
 
Additionally, responsibility to Parliament was cited in Bardolph as the central 
limitation on the Executive’s power to contract.391 
 
It is this key reason that the Executive’s power to contract is limited by reference to 
the Constitution. Therefore, the power to contract is ‘limited by reference to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 252-3 [200], [201] (Hayne J). 
385 Ibid 236 [151] (Gummow and Bell JJ), 352 [519] (Crennan J), 368-9 [577] (Kiefel J). 
386 Ibid 241 [173], 258-9 [215], [216] (Hayne J). 
387 Ibid 254 [206] (Hayne J). 
388 Clark, above n 60, 210 [8.2]. 
389 New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455, 509 (Dixon J). 
390 Ibid, see Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 255 [207] (Hayne J) – Hayne J’s 
emphasis. 
391 Selena Bateman, ‘Constitutional dimensions of State executive power: An analysis of the power to 
contract and spend’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 255, 277. 
	  
	   62	  
extent of the legislative power of the Parliament.’392 It is Parliament’s role in 
scrutinising Executive action to approve or reject requests for appropriation – the 
Executive cannot segregate monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund without 
parliamentary approval in the form of an Appropriation Act.  
 
Finally, the Court’s jurisprudence on the Executive power to contract has not 
conclusively determined how far the contractual capacity of the Commonwealth 
extends.393 Rather, what is recognised is that neither the States nor the 
Commonwealth have unlimited power to contract – that is, the power of a juristic 
person to contract.394 It is clear that the King is less powerful than his subjects. 395 
 
2 Parliament’s role in the appropriation process 
 
Parliament’s role of appropriation is critical to the Executive’s contractual capacity 
because expenditure begins and ends with ss 81 and 83 of the Constitution.396 The 
ability to engage ss 81 and 83 is held exclusively by Parliament and are procedural 
mechanisms allowing segregation of monies from the Consolidated Revenue Fund 
for expenditure by the Executive. 397 The relationship between Parliament and the 
Executive is important. It was moulded by the concept of responsible government in 
the British system; ‘responsible government was seen then as a “government under 
which the Executive is responsible to – nay, is almost the creature of – the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 271 [252] (Hayne J).  
393 Ibid 255 [207] (Hayne J). See: 256-7 [209]-[212]. See also: Commonwealth v Colonial Combing, 
Spinning and Weaving Co Ltd (1922) 31 CLR 421; Kidman v Commonwealth (1925) 37 CLR 233. 
394 Ibid 257 [212] (Hayne J). Note: Clough v Leahy (1904) 2 CLR 139 does not support the 
proposition that the Commonwealth has the same power to contract as a natural person because the 
Commonwealth can make inquiries such as a Royal Commission. Further, this is a significant 
limitation on the polity of a State government to contract; commentators have argued that the 
contractual capacity of a State Executive is ‘unlimited’ by reference to the inherent powers and 
contractual capacity of the British Crown. See: Seddon, above n 235, and for the distinction drawn 
that Bardolph concerned the actions of a State government and did not have the same considerations 
when contracting as the Commonwealth government: Twomey, above n 229, 12, 22. 
395 See: Lindell, above n 191, 348. Cf: New South Wales v Bardolph (1934) 52 CLR 455, 475 (Evatt 
J). 
396 See ibid 352. 
397 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 193-4 [39] (French CJ), 224, [114] (Gummow 
and Bell JJ), 248 [191] (Hayne J), 340 [472]-[474], 341 [478] (Crennan J), 362 [559] (Kiefel J). See 
Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, 23 [5], 35 [53], 55-6 [111]-[113] 
(French CJ), 72-5 [176], [178], [180], [183]-[184] (Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ), 100-1 [283], 105 
[296], 113 [320] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ), 210 [600], 213 [607] (Heydon J); ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (2009) 240 CLR 140, 169 [41] (French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ). See also: 
Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82 (Dixon J). 
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Legislature”’.398 That relationship between Parliament and the Executive is further 
supported by structural considerations of the Constitution.399 These considerations 
are discussed in this paper’s analysis of the narrow basis submission. 
 
A further consideration of the Chief Justice was the position of the Senate in 
protecting the interests of the States, which, his Honour admits is ‘a weak control’.400 
Appleby and McDonald note that his Honour refers to the function of the Senate, that 
being to ‘protect the interests of the States’,401 however, point out that s 7 of the 
Constitution provides that the role of the Senate is to ‘protect the interests of the 
people of each state, not the states as polities’,402 and that his Honour ‘appears to 
have aligned the two’.403 It is well known that the effectiveness of the Senate acting 
as a ‘States house’ to protect the interests of the States has long been surpassed by 
Senators voting in accordance with ‘the party line’.404 Further, the limitations placed 
on the Senate, particularly its inability to amend odd numbered Appropriation Acts 
under s 53 of the Constitution display the Senate’s lack of power as compared to the 
House of Representatives.405 The Senate, of itself, does not utilise the power with 
which it was conceived to use.406 The author’s view is it is erroneous to look to the 
Senate in isolation to promote the interests of responsible government, rather, it must 
be undertaken by Parliament.  
 
Finally, it is clear the Court found that Executive action falls within the confines of 
the Constitution. These confines enable oversight of Executive activity. If the action 
did not fall within the confines, the Executive does not have power to act and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
398 Ibid 349 [508] (Crennan J). See also Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co 
Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 147 (Knox CJ, Issacs, Rich and Starke JJ) – her Honour’s footnote (fn 680) 
provides that this approves the comments made by Lord Haldane, that when a member of House of 
Commons introduced the Bill for the Australian Constitution into the Imperial Parliament 
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Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 558-9 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh, 
Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
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Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 237, 371 (Dixon J); Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 
238 CLR 1, 119 [336], [337], [338] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
400 Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 205-6 [61] (French CJ). 
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402 Appleby and McDonald, above n 144, 264 [fn 59]. 
403 Ibid. 
404 Chordia, Lynch and Williams, above n 43, 205. Also known as ‘party solidarity’. See: Hume, 
Lynch and Williams, above n 19, 80. 
405 See Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 232-3 [136] (Gummow and Bell JJ); Lindell, 
above n 191, 368-9. 
406 Cf Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 316-17 [396] (Heydon J). 
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importantly, the Executive ‘is not authorised by the Constitution to expand its 
powers by contract.’407 
 
In summary, a rejection of the broad basis submission accords with the principle of 
responsible government. If the Executive Government had power to contract in the 
same manner as a juristic person, then as long as valid appropriation provided the 
necessary expenditure, the Executive could enter into any contract it saw fit. 
 
C Australian Constitutional Considerations 
 
Australian constitutional considerations, as briefly explained in Chapter Two, Part IV 
comprise of structural considerations, those being considerations of the distribution 
of powers across the Constitution that regard to federalism and accountability. These 
concern the structure of the Constitution and the institutions thereunder. 
 
This section examines the ‘narrow basis submission’. The narrow basis submission 
was based on statements of three Justices in the AAP Case, to the effect that the 
executive power could be engaged to allow the government to act in any matter that 
could be the subject of legislation, provided that appropriation supported the 
expenditure required.408 Therefore, that the Executive could act within the confines 
of the enumerated heads of power granted to Parliament by the Constitution. 409 
During written and oral argument, this was referred to as the ‘Common 
Assumption’.410 Originally accepted by all parties, including interveners, in written 
submissions, and relied upon during oral argument, counsel for the Attorney-General 
for Western Australia, as intervener,411 renounced written submissions on this point. 
Following Western Australia was Victoria and Queensland, and then the plaintiff and 
most interveners, except New South Wales, joined.412 Although the marked 
departure and new agreement of what was considered the ‘state of the law’ does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
407 Ibid 373-4 (Kiefel J). 
408 See: Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 362 (Barwick CJ). 
409 See: Ibid 338, 362 (Barwick CJ), 379 (Gibbs J), 396 (Mason J). I will interchangeably refer to this 
as the AAP submission. 
410 See generally: Williams v Commonwealth [2011] HCATrans 198 (9 August 2011); Williams v 
Commonwealth [2011] HCATrans 199 (10 August 2011); Williams v Commonwealth [2011] 
HCATrans 200 (11 August 2011). 
411 Mr. R M Mitchell SC, Acting Solicitor-General for Western Australia. 
412 See: Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156, 179 [3] (French CJ); 296 [343] (Heydon J). 
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‘bind the court’,413 the Court, by majority, agreed. What is intriguing, however, is 
that the Court had never ‘decided’ that the common assumption was correct; rather, 
its correctness had been assumed in a number of successive cases.414 Moreover, the 
Common Assumption did not allow the Government carte blanche to engage in 
activities that could be supported by legislation – Parliament always had the ability 
to control or withhold the Executive from engaging in these activities by either 
blocking expenditure requests or passing legislation prohibiting engagement in such 
activity.415 The Court in Williams has added an extra layer of protection, of increased 
responsibility, to Parliament’s oversight ability, by requiring legislation that supports 
the activity. 
 
1 The relationship between Chapter I and Chapter II of the Constitution 
 
Four justices, French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ rejected the narrow basis 
submission on the basis that the Executive power to enter contracts to spend money 
is limited to activities that are supported by legislation.416  
In dealing with the proposition derived from the AAP Case, French CJ opines that 
the understanding of the meaning of the proposition has been misinterpreted. Noting 
the Common Assumption (above) and its construction from the separate comments 
of Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Mason JJ in the AAP Case, it is Mason J’s comments that 
were ‘most influential’.417 In full, it is as follows: 
 
Although the ambit of the [executive] power is not otherwise defined by Ch II it is 
evident that in scope it is not unlimited and that its content does not reach beyond 
the area of responsibilities allocated to the Commonwealth by the Constitution.418 
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Focusing on this,419 French CJ provides that this concept of Executive Power is 
‘consistent with that most recently discussed by this Court in Pape.’ It did not ‘afford 
support for the broad proposition that the Executive Government can do anything 
about which the Parliament of the Commonwealth could make a law.’420 This is 
because Mason J’s opinion in AAP was written in the negative - to what the 
Executive Power could not go beyond – as opposed to the positive, or what the 
Executive Power can extend to. Regardless, French CJ draws the distinction that the 
Court in AAP did not draw: that ‘the subject matters of legislative power are 
specified for the Parliament to yield a law with respect to a subject matter within the 
constitutional grant of legislative authority, not to give content to the executive 
power.’ 421 Therefore, it ‘was not to be understood as affirming that [the executive 
could act upon] any subject on which legislation might be passed.’422 Clearly, his 
Honour considers that what is included in Ch II of the Constitution cannot be 
informed by reference to power in Chapter I; such content must be defined within its 
own sphere. 
 
This is heavily supported by Gummow and Bell JJ who unequivocally state that the 
AAP Case does not support any proposition that the spending power of the Executive 
government is co-extensive with those activities which could be the subject of 
legislation supported by any head of power in s 51 of the Constitution.’423 Citing two 
reasons, their Honour’s provide first the well settled example that there can be no 
taxation except under authority of statute;424 and note that ‘these heads and other 
heads of legislative power [such as marriage and divorce, and bankruptcy and 
insolvency by executive decree] in Ch II are contemplated by the power given to the 
Parliament by Ch III to make laws conferring upon federal courts jurisdiction in 
matters arising under federal laws.’425 Further, ‘while heads of power in s 51 carry 
with them the power to create new offences,426 the Executive cannot create a new 
offence427 and cannot dispense with the operation of any law.428 Secondly, ‘such a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
419 With which Gibbs J opines in near analogous terms and is not inconsistent with that of Barwick CJ. 
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Isaacs J that ‘the Executive cannot change or add to the law; it can only execute it.’: Kidman v 
Commonwealth (1925) 20 CLR 425, 441. 
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proposition would undermine the basal assumption of legislative predominance 
inherited from the United Kingdom and so would distort the relationship between Ch 
I and Ch II of the Constitution.’429 Force for this proposition is enhanced by Crennan 
J, who agreed with this point.430 
 
This illustrates the importance of responsible government, enhancing Executive 
accountability and ‘minimis[ing] the potential for abuse of Executive power’.431 
When considering this against the loose conception of Executive power that 
appeared to come out of the decision in Pape, Williams tightens the accountability 
aspect of responsible government by reference to the notion of parliamentary 
supremacy. 
 
What is apparent from this is that the ‘executive power to enter into contracts or 
spend public money is in most cases limited to that for which it has authority 
positively conferred on it by statute.’432 The support of legislative power is essential 
to responsible government because the fact of supporting legislation shows that the 
activity has been scrutinised and approved by Parliament. 
 
Crennan J distinguished the AAP Case with the present case by providing that the 
AAP Case concerned the bypass of the federal distribution of power, whereas in this 
case, the power purportedly exercised appears to be an attempt at exercising 
prerogative power.433 In particular, her Honour focused upon principles of 
responsible government that limit the exercise of prerogative power, highlighting 
that if there was such a capacity, a source of power must be established.434  
 
No such power had been established and this was further recognised by her Honour 
concluding that as the NSCP did not form ‘a recognised part of the Commonwealth 
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Government administration’ (and therefore, not validly part of an odd numbered 
Appropriation Act), there was an insufficient level of parliamentary scrutiny and 
more was required.435 The basis for this consideration was with reference to the post-
Pape understanding of ss 81 and 83 of the Constitution, that ‘purposes of the 
Commonwealth’ must be determined by reference to Commonwealth legislative 
power. 436 The importance of this is that it alludes to a more rigorous parliamentary 
scrutiny and approval process437 and further entrenches the accountability aspects of 
Pape, which aligns it with extra parliamentary oversight, by way of legislation, for 
Executive activity. 
 
2 The importance of s 96 of the Constitution 
 
The importance of s 96 is discussed at length by Gummow and Bell JJ. This 
structural consideration and how it functions within the federal structure of the 
Constitution, was recently reformulated in ICM Agriculture where it was held that a 
State cannot refer power to the Commonwealth to acquire property ‘on terms other 
than just’438 as a condition of a s 96 grant.439 The importance of this is twofold. First, 
it has been long recognised that in terms of economic bargaining power, the States, 
due to the vertical fiscal imbalance, are in a subservient position vis-à-vis the 
Commonwealth. The requirement in s 96 that the Commonwealth is able to make 
grants ‘on such terms and conditions’ it thinks fit is apt for use to the 
Commonwealth’s advantage. Secondly, although the States are in a position of lesser 
bargaining power, the act of agreeing to the condition of the grant is a voluntary 
act,440 is therefore ‘wear[ing] consensual aspect.’441 If the Executive were able to 
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engage in expenditure that is supported only by Ch II of the Constitution, it would 
not only bypass the requirements of s 96 requiring State consent; it would also entail 
that the Executive could expend monies on any activity it sees fit because it would 
take parliamentary oversight – through Parliament’s control over Ch IV of the 
Constitution - out of the process, therefore eroding, undermining and subverting 
Parliament (and voluntary acceptance by the State(s)).442 It must be remembered that 
Parliament’s power prevails.443 
 
Further, their Honours’ use of the passage of Barwick CJ in the AAP Case highlights 
the significance of s 96 in the federal structure; particularly that if the States did not 
need to consent, ‘it not only alters what may be called the financial federalism of the 
Constitution but it permits the Commonwealth to effectively interfere, without the 
consent of the State, in matters covered by the residue of governmental power 
assigned by the Constitution to the State.’444 
 
Responsible government ‘dictated the conclusion that the power should be confined 
to circumstances where legislative power has actually been exercised to support the 
executive action.’445 
 
III THE NEW ROLE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE EXECUTIVE 
POWER 
 
As a precis, Pape and Williams show that when Executive activity is impugned and 
requires an interpretation of the Executive Power exercised, if appropriate steps are 
not taken to limit the ambit of the executive power, responsible government – 
through a lack of transparency and accountability – is affected.446 The clear issue is 
the depth of executive power.447 When interpreting the depth of the executive power 
(or the ‘maintenance’ limb of s 61), it must be consistent with responsible 
government.448 If not, Parliament cannot perform its oversight function to scrutinise 
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the Executive. Further, it allows the Executive to engage in activity free from 
accountability considerations.  
 
Following Williams, the argument that the executive power is co-extensive with 
legislative power is no more, although, one commentator argues that Gummow, 
Crennan and Bell JJ indicated this in Pape by not considering whether there was a 
legislative power to make laws with respect to emergencies, because, if their 
Honours’ did so, it would indicate the executive power to do so is derived from the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth.449  
 
The recognition that executive’s capacity to enter into contracts and expend money 
derives from the text and structure of the Constitution is key to the argument that 
there is a responsibility and oversight aspect as it necessarily entails that Parliament 
has oversight of the functions relating to expenditure, particularly due to fact that all 
expenditure is of public money. 450 Responsible government was not met by 
ministerial accountability to Parliament or valid appropriation, the passage of 
legislation is required.451 Because of this, it is ‘inconceivable that the authors of the 
Constitution intended by s 96 to create a new source of federal power that is virtually 
unlimited.’452  
 
Further, ‘the most significant feature of Williams was the Court’s willingness to rely 
on considerations of constitutional structure and coherence in determining the ambit 
of Commonwealth power.’453 Constitutional structure and coherence enhance 
Parliament’s supervisory role. The supervisory role of Parliament now extends to 
‘authorising certain executive activities and transactions before those activities are 
entered into or carried on by the government and its agencies.’454 As extensively 
discussed, that authorisation is by way of legislation. That need for legislation 
displays ‘parliamentary scrutiny above and beyond that given to appropriations.’455 
This is particularly important because ‘appropriations are generally stated in such 
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broad purposes that Parliament usually has little idea about what the money will be 
spent on.456 
 
Moreover, because Williams recognised ‘that the scope of the Commonwealth 
executive power is not coextensive with its legislative power… Commonwealth 
executive [action] must now be authorised by the [Parliament],’457 its effect, which 
may now appear trite to say, is that all that is now needed is a validly enacted statute 
that authorises the expenditure of appropriated money.458 If the Commonwealth 
wishes to take a different route, that is, through engaging with s 96, it still accords 
with the ‘prism’459 that expenditure must be viewed through  in light of Williams, 
ensuring first, parliamentary oversight for determining expenditure.460 
 
Additionally, when looking at the ‘responsibility’ aspect in isolation, it does, at least 
in theory, increase the control of the Senate as part of parliamentary scrutiny, 
engaging in methods as noted by Heydon J, such as: 
 
[S]eek[ing] information and crtitcis[ing] proposals to spend money through the 
Senate Estimates Committee, through correspondence with responsible ministers, 
through debate on Appropriation Bills, and through the questioning of the ministers 
who are Senators, or their representatives, in the Senate.461 
 
There is concurrence in Crennan J’s judgment about the importance of these scrutiny 
mechanisms, though her Honour refers to the power of Parliament, through all of its 
members in debate and ‘Question Time’.462  
 
Finally, responsible government is a ‘fundamental constitutional doctrine.’463 While 
Williams provided new considerations for responsible government, particularly in 
light of the Australian constitutional structure, the Court’s increased focus on 
responsible government began in Pape. The importance of the reformulation of the 
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basis of an appropriation464 that brought the ‘purposes of the Commonwealth’ out of 
non-justiciable domain and into an arena where it can be scrutinised, debated, 
amended and legislated, is where responsibility and accountability over the 
Executive is at its highest. As was discussed in Chapter Three, the Constitution 
requires trust for its continued operation. The nation of Australia ‘summoned’465 into 
existence at federation was one that was carefully planned. Most importantly, this 
required positive assent to the polity that was created – the Commonwealth of 
Australia. The significance of that continued assent is reflected in the power of 
Parliament, and the scrutiny of Executive action monitored through responsible 
government and accountability of the Executive by Parliament. It is long recognised 
that the stream cannot rise above its source;466 the power of the Commonwealth was 
crafted with the people, by the people and it was for the people. The people, through 
Parliament, remain the ultimate source of power. The people decide its limit. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis analysed the Executive Power of the Commonwealth and determines that 
the Executive Power is limited by the principle of responsible government. 
 
Chapter One introduced the idea that, although during the Convention Debates and at 
Federation, the Framers conceived the Executive Power to be as wide as the 
legislative power of the Commonwealth, the High Court has taken a different 
approach. Whilst the High Court expanded the reach of Commonwealth legislative 
power, the Executive Power has not been expanded in the same manner; the Court 
has seen fit to treat the Executive Power differently. 
 
Chapter Two introduced the principle of responsible government. It did so by briefly 
outlining Australia’s system of government at the Commonwealth level, and then 
introducing the traditional concepts of representative government and responsible 
government, derived at Westminster and adapted to Australia. By emphasising that 
representative and responsible government principles are entrenched in the 
Constitution, the Chapter suggests a heightened importance of responsibility and 
accountability to Executive activity. Finally, the Chapter argues that the traditional 
principle of responsible government has been modified by the Williams Case, 
accentuating an importance on both Parliament’s oversight of expenditure, and 
constitutional considerations that are unique to the Australian Constitution. 
 
Chapter Three traced the history of the Executive Power in its present form from its 
beginnings as the Crown in the United Kingdom. The tracing exercise first illustrated 
the identity of the Executive arm of government and how it is perceived to those who 
interact with it. The tracing exercise continues to demonstrate how the 
Commonwealth Executive Power evolved from its subservience to the Crown of the 
United Kingdom as the Imperial Dominion to its own legislative and executive 
independence. The Chapter then moves to introduce the three bases on which the 
Executive government acts: exercising non-statutory powers, prerogative power and 
the nationhood power. The location of these powers in s 61 of the Constitution 
creates a difficulty when defining their ambit. Though no exhaustive attempt has 
been made, the High Court, along with commentators, are beginning to shed light on 
the true nature of the Executive Power. It is an evolving power which will require 
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decades of jurisprudence to refine. Finally, the Chapter argues that the Executive 
Power is limited by responsible government in the following way: the Constitution 
and the people who abide by it require each other for their continued existence. It is 
the Constitution that provides for the functioning of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
and it is the people who provide representatives, through election, to the offices 
under the Constitution. Power flows to the Constitution by the people; the people, 
through their parliamentary representatives remain the final check on Executive 
Power. Each Executive decision must come to Parliament for its approval or refusal. 
 
Chapter Four analysed Pape and Williams by reference to the principle of 
responsible government and outlines why the two decisions provide for closer 
scrutiny of Executive activity. First, Pape reformulated the way that appropriations 
are viewed. The result of the reformulation was a significantly reduced ability of 
Executive expenditure because a ‘purpose of the Commonwealth’ is now defined by 
reference to the legislative power of the Parliament, rather than any purpose that the 
Executive think is a purpose of the Commonwealth. The analysis of the Court’s 
treatment of the Executive Power in Pape is generally critical, due to the majority’s 
(French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ’s) conclusion that the nationhood power 
can be engaged to support the impugned Tax Bonus Act in the circumstances it was 
enacted, without proffering a fulsome explanation of reasons as to why. In this 
regard, the analysis moves to highlight, and prefer, Heydon J’s dissent (and to a 
lesser extent Hayne and Kiefel JJ’s) on the basis that the nationhood power needs to 
be referable to the Constitution in order for Parliament to be able to properly 
scrutinise activity undertaken by engagement of the nationhood power. 
 
Second, the Chapter analyses Williams, looking at two key aspects: the need for 
oversight of expenditure and Australian constitutional considerations. The oversight 
of expenditure considerations gained importance by the Court rejecting the 
proposition that the Executive’s power to contract is unlimited. Key to the rejection 
of this proposition is the fact that when the Executive expends money, it is not their 
own. The money is ‘public money’, raised through taxation and, therefore, the power 
to raise this money is exclusively reposed in the Parliament. The corollary is that 
Parliament approves the expenditure of money through an appropriation Act. 
Therefore, it is the Parliament who allow the Executive to engage in activities 
through the Parliament’s ability to withhold funds from the Executive. The 
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constitutional considerations examine the structure of the Constitution, particularly 
the relationship between Ch’s I and II, and the importance of s 96. The relationship 
between Ch I and II of the Constitution brought about the rejection of the submission 
that the Executive can do anything that could be the subject legislation because the 
powers are coextensive. The majority’s (French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ) 
reasoning in this regard points to the notion of parliamentary supremacy; a 
consideration that is important to responsible government because of Parliament’s 
representative aspect. The importance of s 96 focused on the ‘consensual aspect’ of 
the power – that is, that the States voluntarily accept a s 96 grant. As s 96 is located 
in Ch IV of the Constitution, the same Chapter as ss 81 and 83, Parliament has 
ultimate control over the expenditure process.  
 
Ultimately, Pape and Williams demonstrate that the Court now looks to balancing 
the powers across the Constitution. A consequence of this balance highlights the 
dominance of Parliament, particularly with respect to expenditure. Though 
dominance of Parliament may appear, prima facie, as an imbalance; in effect, 
Parliament’s dominance ensures that responsibility and accountability of Executive 




Though French CJ has come under critique for his views of the executive power in 
Pape, his Honour, in this author’s opinion, took great care in engaging with the 
executive power to only what was necessary for the case at hand. His Honour 
certainly has had a leading role in shaping the Executive Power. The amorphous 
nature of the executive power necessitates a cautious, case by case approach to 
establishing – if at all possible – its boundaries. Certainly the ‘French’ conception of 
Executive Power has been a key talking point among critics ever since the Tampa 
Case,467 and as the Hon. Chief Justice French AC provided in an article in 2008,468 
his good friend, the late George Winterton, was particularly critical. As the Chief 
Justice resigns from office on 29 January 2017, students, academics and lawyers will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
467 Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491. 
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no longer have the benefit of his Honour’s curial development of the Executive 
Power. We will be the worse for it. 
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